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ABSTRACT 
 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN PERCEPTION OF THE WAHHABI 
MOVEMENT: FROM NEGOTIATION TO CONFRONTATION (1745-1818) 
   
 
ELİF AYŞENUR CONKER 
M.A. Thesis, January 2018 
Thesis supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Key Words: Wahhabi Movement, Mecca, Medina, Caliphate, Arabia 
 
This study examines the transformation of the Ottoman perception of the Wahhabi 
movement by problematizing how the Ottoman empire politically and religiously reacted 
against the Wahhabi movement, how it perceived the Wahhabis and what policies were 
implemented against them. By this means, it aims to explain the implications of the 
Wahhabi movement over the Ottoman Empire and how the Ottoman official perception 
towards the Wahhabis transformed over time in regard to internal and external problems 
from the beginning of the movement in 1745 to its temporary end in 1818. In order to 
provide answers for these questions, this study considers the general political conditions of 
the 18th century within the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world as well as attempting to 
discuss the characteristic features of the Wahhabi movement by utilizing primary and 
secondary sources. Therefore, this thesis argues that between 1745 and 1802, the Ottoman 
Empire considered the Wahhabi movement as a regional problem, while between 1803 and 
1818 as an existential problem for its presence in the region. 
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ÖZET 
OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU’NDAKİ VEHHABİ ALGISININ DÖNÜŞÜMÜ: 
MÜZAKEREDEN ÇATIŞMAYA (1745-1818) 
 
Elif Ayşenur Conker 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ocak 2018 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Vehhabi Hareketi, Mekke, Medine, Hilafet, Arabistan  
 
Bu çalışma Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Vehhabi hareketine karşı politik ve dini olarak nasıl 
reaksiyon gösterdiğini, Vehhabileri nasıl algıladığını ve onlara karşı hangi politikaları 
uyguladığını sorunsallaştırarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki Vehhabi algısının 
dönüşümünü incelemektir. Bu sayede bu çalışma Vehhabi hareketinin Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu üzerinde oluşturduğu etkileri ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun resmi Vehhabi 
algısının zaman içerisinde iç ve dış problemlere bağlı olarak nasıl değiştiğini hareketin 
başlangıcı sayılan 1745 tarihinden, hareketin geçici olarak sona erdiği 1818 tarihine kadar 
olan dönem içerisinde açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu sorulara cevap sağlayabilmek için 
bu çalışma 18. yy. da Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki ve İslam dünyasındaki genel politik 
koşulları göz önünde bulundurmaktadır, aynı zamanda Vehhabi hareketinin karakteristik 
özelliklerini birincil ve ikincil kaynaklardan faydalanarak tartışmaktadır. Sonuç olarak bu 
tezin argumanı ise Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun 1745 ve 1802 yılları arasında Vehhabi 
hareketini bölgesel bir problem olarak gördüğü ve 1803 ve 1818 yılları arasında ise 
bölgedeki varlığına karşı varlıksal bir tehdit olarak gördüğü yönündedir. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisor Selçuk 
Akşin Somel for all his suggestions, kindness and help. His eye-opening comments have 
shaped my way of thinking, and his guidance, encouragement and contribution have 
enabled me to complete this thesis. I will be always in great debt to him. Yet, the faults and 
omissions in this thesis remain entirely mine. 
I would also like to thank my jury members Yusuf Hakan Erdem and Fatih Bayram for 
their valuable suggestions and criticism. My special thanks go to Mehmet Kanar and Sevim 
Yılmaz Önder for their help in reading the archival documents. I wish to thank Hülya 
Canbakal and Halil Berktay. During my two years of master’s studies at Sabancı 
University, I had the chance to benefit from their historical knowledge and academic 
perspectives as well. 
Lastly, I would like to thank my family and my friends, Gizem Der, Orhun Gündüz, Tuba 
Gündoğdu, Wesam Adel, Doruk Soyata, and Zeqine Sheshi for their support and 
encouragement whenever I needed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... iv 
ÖZET .................................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ viii 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER I ......................................................................................................................... 8 
THE OTTOMAN RULE OVER THE ARAB LANDS ......................................................... 8 
1.1. The Ottoman Conquests of the Arab Lands: ............................................................. 8 
1.2. The Ottoman Rule over Mecca and Medina:........................................................... 12 
1.3. The Islamic Revivalist Movement in the 18th and 19th century of Islamic World: .... 15 
1.4. The Ottoman Empire in the 18th Century: .............................................................. 18 
CHAPTER II ...................................................................................................................... 23 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT ................................................. 23 
2.1. The Founder of the Wahhabi Movement: .................................................................... 23 
2.2. The Sources and Discourse of the Wahhabi Doctrine: ................................................. 24 
2.2.1. The Sources of Wahhabi Doctrine: .............................................................................. 24 
2.2.2. Discourse of the Wahhabi Doctrine: ............................................................................ 27 
2.3. The Spread of the Wahhabi Movement: ...................................................................... 28 
CHAPTER III..................................................................................................................... 36 
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS REACTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
AGAINST THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT ....................................................................... 36 
3.1. The Political Reaction of the Ottoman Empire Against the Wahhabi Movement: ....... 36 
3.1.1. The Wahhabi Movement as a Regional Problem: ........................................................ 37 
3.1.2. The Wahhabi Movement as an International and Existential Problem: ......................... 46 
3.2. Religious Reaction of the Ottoman Empire Against the Wahhabi Movement: ............. 65 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 69 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 73 
 
  
viii 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BOA          Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul (The Ottoman Archives of the   
                            Prime Ministry Office) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Wahhabi Movement as a religious movement emerged in the central Arabia in 
the first half of the 18th century. It developed into a political movement in a short time, and 
changed the political, economic and social structure of the region profoundly. It aimed to 
bring Islam to its original shape by cleaning it from bid’at1 , and this led Wahhabism to 
become a new madhab
2
. Also, it led the Wahhabis to repudiate existing legacy of Islam, 
other madhabs and the traditions of Muslims by labeling them as bid‘at. By this means, not 
only non-Muslims, but also Muslims who did not abide by the Wahhabi doctrine became 
the objects of Wahhabi jihad, and it enabled the Wahhabis to annex substantial areas in 
Arabia until its temporary end in 1818. Additionally, political conditions and fragmented 
political structure of the region caused by the presence of Bedouin tribes helped Wahhabis 
expand in the region. Furthermore, the political upheavals, economic inefficiency and 
military wars of the Ottoman Empire in other parts of the imperial domains hindered the 
Ottomans to tackle with them in an efficient manner. Therefore, these factors also promoted 
their expansion in the region as well as leading to the shaping of the Ottoman policy and 
their perception of the Wahhabis.   
There is number of studies which have been carried out particularly on the Wahhabi 
movement. Yet, the majority of the literature on the Wahhabi movement focuses on the 
Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia in the modern period with only a few of the studies 
concentrating on the early period of the movement. These studies mostly take account of 
the life and the teaching of the founder of the movement, the discourse and the sources of 
the Wahhabi doctrine and its religious dimensions. Additionally, they explain its 
emergence, influence, expansion processes and its implications over the Middle East 
                                                          
1 Bid’a (plural form is bid’at) is defined as “innovation, a belief or practice for which there is no precedent in the time of 
the Prophet. It is the opposite of sunna and is a synonym of muhdath or hadath.” For this, see J. Robson, “Bid’a,” in The 
Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. I. (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 1199.  
2 Madhab means religious sects in Islam. 
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mostly using the Wahhabi sources which omit its reflection on the Ottoman Empire on a 
large extent.  
To illustrate, Natana J. Delong-Bas in her book, “Wahhabi Islam: From Revival 
and Reform to Global Jihad,” focuses on the emergence of the Wahhabi movement, and 
explains the teaching and worldview of the Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Also, she 
displays the approach of Wahhabism towards women. Besides, she tries to provide answers 
to the questions about what the true nature of the Wahhabism is, and whether the teaching 
of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab are the source of terrorism. In addition, she tries to 
answer whether the Wahhabism is responsible from ongoing threat to the U.S and it is 
against Western values and civilization. Yet, her statements in her book shows that she 
thinks otherwise. She claims that the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab do not 
promote terrorism. In fact, it did not allow such violence, and had very different approach 
towards other religions contrary to contemporary militant extremism. Therefore, her 
statements show that she takes a pro-Wahhabi stand in her book. 
David Commins in his book, “the Wahhabi Mission and the Saudi Arabia” covers 
the history of the Wahhabi movement in the 19th century and 20th century. He focuses on 
the development of the Wahhabi thought and its effects over the region. Therefore, he 
analyzes the debate on the nature of Wahhabism, and explains how the Wahhabi movement 
spread and challenged the Ottoman authority in the region. Also, he delineates the 
emergence of Saudi Arabia and ascendance of Wahhabism in the Saudi state with his 
findings. Apart from that, he indicates the places to in which the Wahhabism spread such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its links with the Arab and the South Asian revivalist 
movements in the 19th century and the modern Islamic revivalism like Muslim Brothers in 
the twentieth-century. Moreover, he explains the challenges against the legitimacy of the 
Saudis posed by Ikhwan, Juhayman and Osama bin Laden in the twentieth-century. 
Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin’s book, “Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: The Man 
and His Works” is about the life and the doctrine of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the 
founder of the Wahhabi movement. In his book, he analyzes the works of Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab to explain his religious perspective. Besides, he indicates the historical 
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background of Central Arabia before the emergence of the Wahhabi movement as well as 
explicates Abd al-Wahhab’s political alliance with Al Saud family. 
Michael Cook is another scholar who studied on the Wahhabi movement. In his 
article, “On the Origins of the Wahhabi Movement,” he aims to find answer to the source 
of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab’s doctrine, so he examines and compares the 
contradictory travel accounts of Abd al-Wahhab with each other. Then, he examines the 
scholars mostly cited by Abd al-Wahhab. By this means, he tries to see whether these travel 
accounts and scholars could be the source of his doctrine. Therefore, he argues that these 
travel accounts do not indicate the source of Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, and he claims that 
the most influential scholars on his thoughts were two Hanbelite scholars, Ibn Taymiyya 
and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, from 14th century. 
Besides, Hamid Algar also specifically focuses on the Wahhabi doctrine. In his 
book, “Wahhabism: A critical Essay,” he analyzes the writings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab to see the source of Wahhabism, and he explains how it spread in Arabia. He 
argues that the Wahhabi movement does not have any roots from the past, and does not 
share any similarities with any movements emerging before itself throughout the history of 
Islam. Likewise, he compares the Wahhabi movement with its contemporary Islamic 
revivalist movement, and he argues that the nature of the Wahhabism is different from its 
contemporaries as well.  Yet, he also demonstrates the link between Taliban and Saudi 
authorities created in 1995, and how both sides benefited from each other by supporting 
one another. In addition, he explains how the Wahhabism drew attention with September 
11 because of the Wahhabi background of the attackers. Therefore, Algar takes anti-
Wahhabi stands in his book, and criticizes the movement because of creating chaos and 
problems by distorting fundamental teachings of Islam in the past and in the present day. 
Like Michael Cook and Hamid Algar, Ahmet Vehbi Ecer also discusses the sources 
of Wahhabi doctrine in his book, “Tarihte Vehhabi Hareketi ve Etkileri” (the Wahhabi 
Movement and Its Effects in History). He explains parallel Islamic thoughts to Wahhabism. 
Then, he argues that Kharjites, Hanbalites, Zahiris and Ibn Taymiyyah were the ideological 
fuels of Wahhabism because the Wahhabism shared important similarities with them about 
understanding of Qur’an and Islam. Besides, he explains the emergence of the Wahhabi 
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movement, how it gained its political aspect, and how it challenged the Ottoman authority 
in the region. Furthermore, he also indicates the situation after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire in the region in the beginning of 20th century, and shows the places and people 
who were influenced by the ideology of Wahhabi movement. 
Zekeriya Kurşun is another important scholar studying the Wahhabi movement. In 
his book, “Necid ve Ahsa ’da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devleti’nin 
Ortaya Çıkışı” (the Ottoman Domination in Najd and Ahsa: the Wahhabi Movement and 
the Emergence of the Saudi State) enucleates the birth and the development of Wahhabi 
movement, also its role in the process which prepared the path to the establishment of 
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, he indicates how the Wahhabi movement emerged, spread and 
challenged the Ottoman authority in the region. Also, he explicates how the Ottomans 
reacted the Wahhabi movement and tried to solve this problem in the region during this 
process. 
Selda Güner also studies on the Wahhabi movement. In her book, “Wahhabi-Saudis 
(1744-1819) Mutiny and Banishment in the Ottoman Arabia (Vehhabi-Suudiler (1744-
1819) Osmanlı Arabistanı'nda Kıyam ve Tenkil), she studies on the first phase of the 
Wahhabi movement which is from 1744/5 to 1819. She analyzes the movement in terms of 
religion and sociology of the Ottoman Arabian Peninsula. Yet, she is doing this analysis 
underlining the Ottoman presence in the region in that century. Therefore, she explains the 
history of the Wahhabism and the Saudi family, and their political alliance with 
Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahhab. She compares the Wahhabi movement with other Salafi 
movements. Moreover, she points out the Ottoman reaction against the Wahhabi 
movement, and their perception about the Wahhabis.    
Apart from the studies listed above and differently from them, Fatih M. Şeker 
focuses on the different side of the movement in his book, “Osmanlılar ve Vehhabilik” 
(The Ottomans and the Wahhabism). The studies mentioned before is mostly explaining 
and analyzing the movement itself. Yet, Şeker focus on the Wahhabi movement from the 
Ottoman Empire’s point of view. This is why he compares and indicates the Wahhabi 
perceptions of the two Ottoman intellectuals who are Ahmet Cevdet Pasha from the 19th 
century and Hüseyin Kazım Kadri from the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
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century. He discusses the reflections of the Wahhabism on the Ottoman intellectuals, and 
whether there was an Ottoman Salafism or not. Also, he analyzes the Wahhabi movement, 
and evaluates it as a state subversive movement. 
Like Şeker, Emine Ö. Evered in her article, “Reading Ottoman Accounts of 
Wahhabism as Alternative Narratives: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s Historical Survey of the 
Movement” also analyzes the movement from the Ottoman Empire’s point of view. This is 
why she uses the accounts of the Ottoman bureaucrat, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, to explain the 
birth and spread of Wahhabi movement in the region.  
Betül Ayaz in her Ph.D. dissertation, “Hilafet ve Siyaset: Osmanlı Devleti’nin Hac 
Hizmetleri (1798-1876)” (Caliphate and Politics: Hajj services of the Ottoman State (1798- 
1876) also focuses on the Ottoman side of the story. She argues that French occupation of 
Egypt, and Wahhabi revolt in Hijaz interrupted the pilgrim service of the Ottoman Empire, 
and it caused the Ottoman Empire to lose its prestige as the representative of the caliphate. 
Therefore, she explains the efforts of the Sublime Porte to create a unified force with its 
governors to topple the Wahhabis from Hijaz, and to restore its prestige in the Islamic 
world. 
Therefore, most of these studies focus on the movement itself, and only a few of 
them argue the movement from the Ottoman side, and reflect the Ottoman perception of the 
Wahhabis. Yet, even these few ones only show the discussions among the Ottomans to 
generate solutions against the Wahhabi incident. They do not pay attention specifically 
whether the Sublime Porte tried to negotiate with the Wahhabis to solve the crisis in the 
region. This is why, different from other studies; the main focus of this research is to 
construe the negotiations between the Ottomans and the Wahhabis, and the transformation 
of Ottoman perception towards the Wahhabis. By this way, this study aims to contribute to 
our understanding of both the history of the movement, and its implications over the 
Ottoman empire. To achieve this goal, this study examines the political and religious 
reaction of the Ottoman Empire, and its policies towards the Wahhabi movement in order 
to understand how the Ottoman official perception of the Wahhabi movement transformed 
over time in regard to internal and external problems from the beginning of the movement 
in 1745 to the temporary end in 1818.   
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Therefore, this study argues that the Ottoman perception towards the Wahhabi 
movement transformed over time. From the beginning of the movement in 1745 to the 
Wahhabi invasion of Al-Ahsa in 1795, the Ottoman Empire did not consider the movement 
a serious political problem. Rather, it evaluated it as a minor local problem between the 
Wahhabis and the Meccan Sharif. Yet, since the Wahhabis became a regional problem with 
the invasion of Al-Ahsa, the Sublime Porte realized the gravity of the Wahhabi threat, and 
started to play mediator role to palliate the animosity between the Wahhabis and the Sharif 
of Mecca. In 1802, with the Karbala incident, the Wahhabi movement became much more 
serious political issue turning into an international problem since it caused a political crisis 
between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. After that incident, the Sublime Porte left its 
mediator role as a third party, and became the side of the negotiations by sending an alim, 
Adem Efendi, to negotiate with the Wahhabis on its behalf. When it comes to 1803 and 
1805, the invasion of Mecca and Medina dramatically changed once again the Ottoman 
perception towards the Wahhabis. The reason behind this was the fact that they challenged 
the Ottoman domination by invading these regions with the claim of Sultanate and 
Caliphate as well as forestalling the pilgrim routes. Yet, the Ottoman Empire continued its 
negotiation policy until 1809 since it had to deal with other political problems. In 1810, its 
policy shifted from negotiation to confrontation with the Wahhabis by ordering the 
governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, to go to Haramayn against the Wahhabis. 
In order to understand the Ottoman presence in this region, the first chapter explains 
the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces. Also, it draws the general picture of the 18
th
 
century within the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire to understand the political 
environment which the Wahhabi movement was born into. 
In the second chapter, the Wahhabi movement is examined in detail in order to 
comprehend how it emerged, what its sources and discourse were and how it spread in the 
region.  
The last chapter analyzes how the Ottoman Empire politically reacted to the 
Wahhabi movement to understand how the Ottomans perceived the Wahhabis. To do this, 
studies concentrating on the early period of the movement are used as secondary sources, 
and they are combined with the primary sources, which are the archival documents of the 
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Ottoman Empire. Yet, since there are a lot of archival documents about the Wahhabi 
movement, only the documents that reflect the negotiations and peace agreements between 
the Ottoman Empire and the Wahhabis are selected and used in this study.  
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CHAPTER I 
THE OTTOMAN RULE OVER THE ARAB LANDS 
 
1.1. The Ottoman Conquests of the Arab Lands:  
 
The Ottoman conquest of the Arab lands started with the reign of Selim I in the 16
th
 
century.
3
 Putting an end to the Mamluks in 1517, Selim I took control of Egypt, Syria and 
some parts of South Anatolia.
4
 Also, the conquest of the Mamluk lands enabled the 
Ottoman Empire to control Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina, and brought the responsibility of 
the pilgrimage to the Ottoman Empire.
5
Thus, the Ottoman Empire became the sole 
representative of Sunni Islam, and the title of ‘servitor of Mecca and Medina’(Khadim al-
Haramayn al-Sharifayn) used by Selim I enhanced the new role of the Ottoman empire as 
protector of Sunni Islam.
6
 Since then, these holy cities provided legitimacy for the claim of 
the Ottoman sultans on caliphate.
7
 After Selim I, Suleiman the Magnificent maintained the 
Ottoman conquest of the Arab lands. During his reign, he conquered Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, 
Algeria and Yemen in the 16th century. Yet, he could control Morocco only for a short 
period in the 16
th
 century.
8
 
The results of these conquests were that they firstly enabled the Ottomans to control 
almost all of the Arab lands in the 16th century. Secondly, the Muslim population 
outnumbered the Christian population within the Empire, and these conquests generated a 
                                                          
3 André Raymond, Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri, trans. Ali Berktay (İstanbul: Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı 
Yayını, 1995), 1. 
4 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 2009), 40. 
5 Jane Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule,1516-1800 (New York: Routledge, 2013), 44.; Bruce Masters, 
The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 20. 
6 Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, 44. 
7 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 11,12. 
8 Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, 40. 
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synthesis of the Arab and the Ottoman Islamic culture.
9
 Last but not least, “the conquest of 
the Arab lands marked, however, a significant geopolitical shift in the empire’s territorial 
expansion from the European periphery of the Dar al-Islam (“The House of Islam,” i.e., the 
lands under Muslim rule) into its historic heartland.”10For this reason, “it was no longer a 
predominantly Balkan empire with a largely Christian population.”11 
Apart from the conquests of the Arab lands, how the Ottoman Empire governed 
these lands is a very important question to answer to be able to see how much the Ottoman 
authority was efficient, and how the Ottomans consolidated their rule in these regions. To 
explain, the Ottoman Empire was already divided into provinces within itself, and these 
lands became the new Ottoman provinces, so the Ottoman Empire consisted of 36 
provinces, and 12 of them were the Arab provinces. After the conquests, the Ottoman 
Empire established similar governmental systems in these regions which contained 3 
important components. These were the governors, the qadis, and law enforcement 
authorities such as the Janissaries. The governors of the provinces who were high ranked 
pashas like viziers were directly appointed by the central government, Istanbul, to these 
provinces.
12
 Yet, although the Ottomans established their own governmental system, they 
needed the cooperation of the local Sunni Arab speaking elites to adjust its rule over the 
existed system.
13
By this means, local leaders of these regions could also become very 
influential over the governmental system. In addition, to be able to incorporate these 
conquered Arab lands into the Ottoman system, the Ottomans also sustained the old land 
tenure and taxation systems of these regions.
14
 
However, Andre Raymond states that the level of the involvement of the center 
within the periphery was changing from region to region. For instance, Algeria and Tunisia 
were more autonomous regions compared to the others because there was a big distance 
between the Ottoman center and these provinces. On the other hand, because of its strategic 
significance and its proximity to the center, the power of the central government was felt 
                                                          
9 Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918, 20.; Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle 
East, 41. 
10 Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918, 30. 
11 Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, 40. 
12 Raymond, Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri, 4. 
13 Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918, 48. 
14 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 9. 
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more strongly in Aleppo.
15
 Besides Raymond, Şükrü Hanioğlu states that “Ottoman control 
of the Arabian Peninsula was no better. Despite claims to the entire peninsula, based on 
pledges of allegiance made by tribal leaders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
central rule was limited to the coastal areas along the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and to the 
Hijāz.”16 Yet, Raymond also states that although the level of interference changed from 
region to region, the authority of the sultan was always felt even within the furthest 
provinces.
17
 Therefore, this situation shows that the relation between the center and 
periphery was strong even though the Ottomans had to give some concessions to the local 
leaders to be able to control these regions. 
Besides, it is important to note that to be able to explain the longevity of the 
Ottoman rule in its all provinces, the system the Ottomans established in these regions 
should be taken into consideration. William Cleveland puts forward that even though the 
Ottoman Empire established its governmental system, it sustained many features of the old 
systems of the conquered lands, too. They changed only the things they saw necessary to 
provide efficiency for governing in these regions, and they maintained the diversities, local 
traditions and practices to provide peace and stability in these conquered regions. Thus, the 
Ottomans could maintain its authority in the regions for a long time.
18
 
Apart from the system the Ottomans established in the Arab lands and their 
cooperation with the Arab speaking elites, Islam also played a very crucial role in 
consolidation of the Ottoman rule in these lands. To explain, the Ottoman Empire was the 
representative of the Sunni Islam as the Mamluks were. However, differently from the 
Mamluks, the Ottomans recognized Hanafism as the official sect of the state, and Hanafism 
was more widespread in Anatolia and the Balkans. On the other hand, the considerable 
portion of the population in the Arab lands “that is, Syria, Egypt, the western Arabian 
Peninsula, and the coastal regions of Yemen”19were not Hanafi, although they were Sunni 
Muslims. Additionally, Syria mostly consisted of Shafiis, but also had several Hanafis and 
Hanbalis as well. In Lower Egypt and northern Iraq, there were mostly Shafiis, as well. In 
                                                          
15 André Raymond, Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri, 8,9. 
16 Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 11. 
17 Raymond, Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri, 8,9,14. 
18 Cleveland and Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 42,44. 
19 Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, 46. 
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Upper Egypt, there were mostly Malikis. Yet, Yemen was different with its mixed sects. 
There were Shafiis, Zaydis, and the Twelve Imams.
20
 In the central Arabia, the common 
madhab was Hanbalism
21
, so the majority of the Ottoman subjects were Muslims, 
especially Sunni Muslims. Yet, there were also some groups of religious minorities like 
Christians, Jews, Shiites which were Zaydi Shiites, Twelve Imams and Ismaili’s. There 
were also heterodox minorities like Alevites, Druze and Yazidis.
22
This is why, to be able to 
accommodate its rule within these religiously diversified regions, and establish itself as 
their ruler, the Ottoman Empire put emphasis on Islam to forge a solid bound with them. 
By this way, the Ottoman presence could be embraced by its Sunni Arab 
subjects.
23
Moreover, the Ottoman Empire granted some concessions to non-Muslims, and 
non-Sunni Muslims as well so as to keep them obedient in return of whose taxes they 
enjoyed having religious autonomy granted by the Ottoman Empire.
24
 
The question of the geographic term used by Ottoman Empire to name these lands 
is also significant to answer. The Ottomans did not use the term the Middle East because it 
is a modern term and a Eurocentric notion which represented the British and the American 
interests over the region.
25
 They used the term of Maghrib to define the western part of the 
region which covered today’s North African countries like Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco, and used Mashriq to define the eastern part of the region which covered Egypt, 
the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Lebanon Israel and Palestine, Jordan and Iraq. On the other 
hand, Western Europeans in the 19
th
 century used the term Near East for Eastern 
Mediterranean, the largest part of the Anatolian peninsula and present-time Southeast 
Europe because these lands were near to Europe and had the closest relations with 
Europe.
26
Yet, the term of Middle East was invented by an American admiral, Alfred 
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Yayınları, 2012), 91. 
22 Hathaway, The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800, 4,5,29-34. 
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Thayer Mahan, in 1902 to define the lands between Mediterranean and India, and this term 
prevailed over the term of Near East. Yet, Mahan did not specify the boundaries of the 
region, and the term of Middle East covered larger areas than the term of Near East. 
Moreover, the scope of lands which go under the term of the Middle East has been changed 
times to times due to the interests of the Britain and the United states over the region. Yet, 
the term is still in use today.
27
  
 
1.2. The Ottoman Rule over Mecca and Medina: 
 
As it was mentioned before, the defeat of the Mamluks not only enabled the 
Ottomans to dominate Egypt and Syria, but also brought the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina in Hijaz under the Ottoman authority.
28
 Thus, it enabled the Ottomans to control 
the pilgrim routes, and the cities like Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad were used by pilgrim 
caravans for provisioning. Most importantly, controlling pilgrim routes enabled the 
Ottomans to urge their supremacy over the holy cities of Islam.
29
 And it provided a solid 
ground for the Ottoman sultans to lean their claim on caliphate. This claim was important 
for the domination of Ottoman sultans over Hijaz because the Ottoman control was limited 
there.
30
  
However, before the Ottoman control over Mecca, the Ottoman sultans had already 
established relationship with the Sharifs of Mecca, and they were keeping in touch with 
them to address them their sympathy, so starting from Beyazıd I onwards, the Ottoman 
Sultans; Mehmed I, Murad II, Mehmed II and Bayezid II delivered prominent notables of 
Mecca and Medina money as a gift which was called sürre.31After defeating the Mamluks, 
Selim I and other Ottoman Sultans also continued sending gifts, and they even increased 
the quantity of the gifts they sent. Moreover, with Selim I, sending sürre became a tradition 
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within the Ottoman Empire, and every year, the Ottoman sultans sent gifts to the people of 
Mecca and Medina.
32
 These gifts were generally sent with a regiment, known as sürre 
alayı, before pilgrim period, and they were sent with a special ceremony from Istanbul to 
the holy cities. In addition to money, valuable clothes and food were sent as well. Yet, 
these gifts were not only sent for prominent people of Mecca and Medina, but also poor 
people of Mecca and Medina as well.
33
 
Besides, after Selim I defeated the Mamluks, he planned to capture Mecca as well. 
Yet, he did not carry out his plan because the Meccan Sharif, Barakat ibn Muhammad, sent 
the keys of Mecca through his son, Abu Numay, to Egypt to offer them to Selim I. Thus, 
the Sharif showed his subordination to his rule.
34
 Moreover, the submission of the Sharif of 
Mecca also brought Medina under the Ottoman control because the Sharif of Medina was 
under the rule of the Sharif of Mecca.
35
 Therefore, in return for his subordination, Selim I 
appointed him as the Sharif of Mecca, and he sent gifts with his son to Mecca.
36
 Also, the 
Ottomans did not change the status of Medina, and the privileged status of the ruling family 
of the Sharif of Medina as well. This is because the Ottomans were respecting to the ruling 
family of the Sharifs of Mecca and Medina who were descendants of the prophet 
Muhammad.
37
  
After the Sharif’s son returned to Mecca with the gifts in July of 1517 (923 Recep), 
the name of the Ottoman sultan started to be mentioned during the sermons in mosques in 
Mecca and Medina.
38Also, “the sultan was honored with the title of Servant of the 
Haramayn (the two mosques), while the Grand Sharif earned money and prestige as the 
head of the entire hajj. His power depended partly on his ability to maneuver vis-à-vis the 
Ottoman government…”39 The reason behind this was the fact that, from then on, the 
Ottoman sultans continued to appoint the Sharif of Mecca, and the opinions of the Sharifs 
in Mecca, the qadi of Mecca, governors of Egypt, Damascus and Jeddah were very 
                                                          
32 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 14. 
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34 Mustafa Sabri Küçükaşcı, Abbasiler’den Osmanlılar’a Mekke-Medine Tarihi (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007), 160. 
35Mustafa Sabri Küçükaşçı, “Medine,” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 28. (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet 
Vakfı, 2003), 311,312. 
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37 Küçükaşçı, “Medine,” 311,312.; Atalar, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Surre-i Hümâyûn ve Surre Alayları, 9.  
38 İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 18. 
39 Mai Yamani, Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and The Quest for an Arab Identity, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 3. 
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influential in the appointment of the new Sharif as the Amir of Mecca.
40
 However, 
“throughout most of their rule, the Ottomans allowed the Sharif a free hand in the 
management of Mecca and Medina, while the residents of the Hijaz received subsidies from 
the Sultan and were exempt from taxation and military conscription”.41 Furthermore, the 
Sharif protected the importance of his status in the Islamic world thanks to the connection 
of his lineage to the prophet Muhammad, which enabled him to receive the high respect of 
the Ottoman sultans.
42
  
This is why, unlike the other provinces in the Ottoman Empire, Hijaz enjoyed an 
exclusive status. Although Hijaz came under the rule of the Ottoman sultans, it actually 
stayed autonomous. This situation even continued after the Tanzimat period which brought 
Hijaz under direct Ottoman rule in 1840, and resulted in two-headed governorship in Hijaz 
administration. Therefore, the efforts of the Ottoman Empire to decrease the authority of 
the Meccan Sharif failed vis-á-vis the efforts of the Sharif to protect its autonomous status 
in the region.
43
 In fact, “it was impossible for İstanbul to bypass the Meccan Sharif 
completely because they needed him to tackle with the straggling Bedouin tribes who 
recognized only the Sharif as the authority”44 This is why Akşin Somel states that in such a 
case, the Ottoman Empire would jeopardize the safety of the pilgrim routes which could 
negatively influence the Ottoman claim for the caliphate.
45
 Also, Selda Güner puts forward 
the argument that after the Ottoman domination in the region, the Ottomans did not try to 
control these nomadic Bedouins unless there was no necessity. The superiority of the 
Bedouin Arabs in the deserts can provide an explanation for it. The Bedouin Arabs were 
taking tribute from the trade caravans and the passengers, or they plundered their goods. 
This is why the Ottomans left the control to big tribes like Bani Khalids in Ahsa and Sharifs 
in Mecca, but it tried to establish its authority and control over them by appointing Ottoman 
officers like qadis and governors to the central places like Jeddah, Mecca and Medina.
46
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Therefore, it can be understood that the Ottoman Empire had to negotiate with the 
local leaders of the conquered regions. In the case of Mecca, it was the Sharif of Mecca 
whose subordination was needed for the Ottoman Empire. However, it seems that even 
though the Ottoman Empire had to negotiate and incorporate the local elites into the 
administration at other imperial regions, they were less autonomous in comparison to the 
Sharif of Mecca. The Sharif of Mecca seems to have been one of the most autonomous 
local leaders among other provincial notables, enjoying semi-independence. 
 
1.3. The Islamic Revivalist Movement in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century of Islamic World: 
 
The 18
th
 century witnessed a wave of the Islamic revivalist movements in various 
places which aimed renewal and reform of Islam,
47
 and these movements were also called 
as Salafi movements whose definition came to existence within the 19
th
 century.
48
 To 
explain, “the term “salafi” is used to denote those who follow the example of the 
companions (salaf) of the Prophet Mohammed. Salafis believe that because the companions 
learned about Islam directly from the Prophet, they commanded a pure understanding of the 
faith.”49 However, after Islam was filled with bid’at over time, these bid’at caused to the 
deterioration of Islam. This is why Salafis aimed to return Islam to its original shape by 
taking bid’at out of it, and to cleanse Islam, they prescribed to consider only the Qur’an, the 
Sunna and the consensus of the companions.
50
 
Salafism took its current shape, and turned into a movement with the efforts of Ibn 
Taymiyya and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah in the second half of thirteenth 
century.
51
 Yet, there are different ideas arguing whether there is a continuation and 
homogeneity among the salafi movements, and Selda Güner criticizes the argument which 
sees the all salafi movements one and same. According to her, all of the Salafi movements 
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had same (salafi) rhetoric about renewal of Islam, but its application changed from one 
Salafi movement to another because their organizations and their ways in using this rhetoric 
were differing among each other.
52
 That’s because they were born within different local 
conditions.
53
 
The emergence of revivalist movements is explained by the conditions which the 
Islamic states were experiencing. To explain, revivalist movements rose in connection with 
the stability and prosperity of individual Muslim countries. In addition, internal and 
external problems of each country affected people to regard tajdid, renewal, as necessary. 
When these problems occurred, they weakened the Muslim states economically and 
politically against Europe, and these problems mostly resulted in the emergence of 
revivalist movements in the 18
th 
and 19
th
 century.
54
 To illustrate, the revivalist movements, 
in other words Salafi movements which came up within the Islamic world during the 18
th 
and 19
th
 centuries were the movements of Shah Waliullah al-Dihlawi in India, Wahhabi 
movement of Muhammad Ibn Abd-al Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula, Muhammad Ali 
al-Sanussi-Senussi movement( 1787-1859) in North Africa and Egypt, Idrisi movement in 
the East Africa, Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817) in northern Nigeria in West Africa, and 
Muhammad Ahmad al Mahdi ( 1881-1898) in Sudan.
55
 In addition, Sayyid Muhammad 
‘Abdallah Hasan (1864-1920) in Somalia, Hajji Shari’at Allah ( 1781-1840) in Bengal, al-
Hajj ‘Umar Tal( 1794-1865) in Guinea, Senegal and Mali in West Africa were other 
examples of the revivalist movements in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries.
56
 The common point of 
almost all of these movements was their emergence as a reaction to the weakening of the 
Muslim states which resulted from the commercial penetration of the European states over 
the Islamic world.
57
  
However, different from other revivalist movements, Wahhabi movement and the 
movement of Uthman don Fodio did not occur following European involvement in their 
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regions.
58
 Besides, Wahhabism has a unique place among other revivalist movements 
because Wahhabism did not appear to resist infidel (Christian) domination, but a Muslim 
authority, namely the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it was different from other movements 
because of its purist attitude. To explain, Selda Güner puts forward that Wahhabism was a 
different kind of a Salafi movement because it completely rejected the whole legacy of 
Islam which existed throughout history. Salafism, on the other hand, doesn’t necessarily 
imply a complete rejection of the whole legacy of Islam and traditions. It rather aims to fix, 
restore the distorted parts of Islam by taking only bid’at out of it. Because of this, Güner 
claims that Wahhabism has a distinct kind of interpretation of Islam compared to the other 
Salafi movements.
59
  
Besides Güner, Ahmad Dallal who compares in his article the works of the Arabian 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787), the Indian Shah Wali Allah (1703-1762), the 
west African Uthman Ibn Fudi (1754-1817), and the north African Muhammad Ali al-
Sanusi (1787- 1859) with each other
60
 develops his analysis and claims that 
“Characterizing and comparing different strains of Islamic thought instead of quoting 
isolated ideas out of their general ideological context yields markedly different objects and 
objectives of revival in each of the examined cases. Contrary to accepted paradigms, 
neither the emphasis on ijtihad nor the new conceptions of Sufism were common features 
of the thought of the period in question. No unifying themes can be identified that warrant 
grouping these ideologies, and by extension the movements they initiated, under one rubric 
…”61 Dallal also criticizes the idea of giving these scholars’ educational background as an 
example to provide them a common base. This is why he states that although these scholars 
who were from different parts of the world were educated by the same hadith teachers in 
Mecca and Medina, it did not mean that this generalization is always compatible with the 
characteristic features of all revivalist movements. To buttress his claim, Dallal conveys the 
anti-Wahhabi stance of the scholars like Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Kurdi and 
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Muhammad Haya al-Sindi, and their advice to their students to be cautious about the 
inordinateness of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
62
 
Therefore, it seems that the classification of the revivalist movements under a 
common roof is rather controversial among the scholars. Yet, one thing seems certain about 
them. Even though the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century generated many important revivalist 
movements in the Islamic world, Wahhabism demonstrated a sui generis place among them 
due to its distinct features. 
 
1.4. The Ottoman Empire in the 18
th
 Century: 
 
In the 18
th
 century, the Ottoman empire achieved to survive from the economic 
crisis of 17
th
 century, and could reach relatively better economic conditions in this century, 
which also helped Ottoman society have more social stability as well. Yet, even though the 
Ottoman empire managed to overcome social unrest within society like the major challenge 
of the Jalali revolts and excessive attempts of Kadızadeli movement to cleanse Islam in the 
17
th
 century,
63
 it still had to pass through very hard times in the 18
th
 century as well because 
of loss of huge territories to the European states like Russia, Habsburg and France. Starting 
from the 16
th
 century, the European states began to improve their military technologies and 
accumulated wealth thanks to the New World resources. These developments eventually 
caused the Ottomans to lose their military superiority over Europe over time, and enabled 
Europe to increase its power, which resulted in the Ottoman military defeats. This is why 
Donald Quataert defines the 18
th
 century of the Ottoman Empire as the century of military 
defeats and territorial loss. However, Quataert also states that even though this militarily 
failed century actually started with the Siege of Vienna in 1683 and continued until the 
invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798, the Empire in fact experienced a 
transformation period rather than decline. As a result of this situation, the political structure 
of the Empire took new shapes and evolved during that process.
64
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To illustrate the military and political failures of the Ottoman Empire, first, the 
Treaty of Karlowitz can be an example. The treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 which resulted 
from the failure of the Ottoman army in the Siege of Vienna is very important for the 
Ottoman history. With this treaty, the Ottoman Empire experienced losing its huge 
territories, and for the first time it recognized a treaty whereby abandoning its territories 
permanently to the European states like the Habsburg Empire, Venice and even 
Russia.
65
Moreover, after Karlowitz, the Ottomans experienced another territorial loss with 
the Treaty of Passarowitz in Europe in 1718, and substantial territories were ceded by the 
Habsburgs.
66
 Besides Europe, in the east, the Ottomans lost Azerbaijan and some border 
territories to Iran during the series of wars between 1723-1736. 
67
 
Apart from that, like the Karlowitz treaty, the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774 
resulting from the war with Russia between 1768-1774 had profound impacts on the 
Ottoman empire. To explain, like the Karlowitz treaty, the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca also 
cost major territorial losses for the Ottomans. In addition, the Ottomans had to pay a 
considerable amount of money a war compensation to Russia. Yet, most importantly the 
relation between the Ottoman Empire and Crimea was cut by Russia, which made Crimea 
politically independent although it religiously remained connected to the Ottoman 
caliphate. This situation negatively affected the Ottoman army because it prevented the 
Ottomans to receive the support of Crimean army in battles. Also, the Ottomans lost their 
domination over the Black Sea, and this treaty provided Russia a passage from the Black 
Sea to the Mediterranean by using the Ottoman straights. The importance of the treaty for 
the Ottomans lies in the fact that the Ottoman sultan was recognized as a caliph in an 
international treaty for the first time which enabled the Ottoman sultans to sustain its 
religious leadership among the Muslims of Crimea. However, Russia gained the right to be 
the spiritual leader of the Orthodox within the Ottoman Empire as well.
68
  
In addition to the Karlowitz and Küçük Kaynarca treaties, another important treaty 
signed by the Ottomans was the Treaty of Jassy in 1792 resulting from the war with the 
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Russians between 1787-1792. With this treaty, Russia annexed Crimea, and it became a 
Russian territory. Besides the wars with Russia, at the end of the century, the Ottomans had 
to witness the temporary invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 as well.
69
  
The reason for these catastrophic warfares and territorial losses appeared to be the 
lack of a standing army similar to its European adversaries. In this century, the Ottoman 
army increasingly remained backward in comparison to European military forces. Because 
of this, Selim III (r.1789-1807) whose reign witnessed serious political upheavals and 
further military losses ordered the establishment of a professional standing army.
70
 
Apart from the wars in this century, the Ottoman Empire also experienced notable 
changes in its political structure as well. Hanioğlu states that “the most salient characteristic 
of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century was its decentralization.”71 In 
this century, ayans, in other words local notables, gained power in the Ottoman periphery 
thanks to the “Malikane system” which started to be used in 1695 and became widespread 
in the 18
th
 century.
72
 With this system, the government aimed to close the budget deficit 
resulting from the intensive wars at the end of the 17
th
 century. This is why, the government 
started to give over the lands to tax-farmers for life term.
73
These ayans were sending 
soldiers as well whenever requested by the Sublime Porte. As a result of this situation, the 
Ottoman center over time became dependent on local notables in financial, administrative 
and military issues. During times of international confrontations, the Ottoman state needed 
their military and economic support to be able to fight in the battles.
74
 
This dependency of the Ottoman center on the ayans did increase particularly 
during the Russian wars of 1768-74 and 1787-92, which signified the growing political 
power of them.
75
 However, this dependency was in fact mutual. As the central government 
needed them, they in turn needed the Sublime Porte; local notables could not act 
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completely independent from the center or they could not revolt against it even though they 
sometimes showed disobedience to Istanbul. Yet, in the end, they had to compromise and 
comply with the orders of the government. They had to have good relations with the 
Sublime Porte; to be able to hold the control of the lands in their hands, they needed the 
confirmation of the sultanic authority to acquire legitimacy. Therefore, the Malikane 
system rendered local notables dependent on the Ottoman government as it also did 
Istanbul to local notables.
76
  
Apart from rise of local notables resulting in the decentralization of the Ottoman 
Empire from the late 17
th
 century onwards, there was another important change in the 
political structure of the Empire. In this century, unlike its European counterparts, the 
Ottoman Empire displayed a different kind of a transformation of ruling system. To 
explain, while European rulers were concentrating all the power in their hands, the Ottoman 
sultans were losing direct control over the empire. This is why Quataert states that “during 
the eighteenth century, the sultan most often possessed symbolic power only, confirming 
changes or actions initiated by others in political life”77. Like Quataert, Carter Vaughn 
Findley in his article indicates similar ideas. He also states that although the Sultans’ 
powers were not decreased in principle, starting from the 17
th
 century, the power shifted 
from the sultans to households of viziers and pashas. Yet, it started to change with the 
centralization reforms in the late 18
th
 century. In that situation, the support of palace 
women played an important role because although their rule over harem was over, they 
continued to keep their power by marrying their daughters to dignitaries to be able to 
establish alliance and sustain their power.
78
 The unsuccessful coup attempt of the Sultan 
Mustafa II in 1703, called “First Edirne Event”, to take the power in his hand again 
promoted this situation. The reason behind this was “thereafter the sultan’s powers and 
stature were so reduced that he was required to seek the advice of “interested parties” and 
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heed their counsel,” and his failure strengthened the hands of vizier and pashas’ households 
including their allies, Ulama. Thus, they shaped the politics at the center in 18
th
 century. 
79
 
However, Quataert also states that after the sultans lost their supremacy within the 
local politics in İstanbul, they tried to find solutions to increase their power and sustain 
their legitimacy. For this reason, they concentrated their efforts on reorganizing the pilgrim 
routes to Mecca and Medina. Also, their claim as caliph required them to attend the security 
issues of pilgrims and pilgrim routes in this century more than before.
80
  
In fact, the Ottoman sultans had to protect their prestige against the Wahhabi 
movement, which is the main subject of this study. As will be discussed in greater detail 
below, Wahhabis started an insurrection under the leadership of al-Saud family to destroy 
the Ottoman authority by attacking pilgrim routes during the second half of the 18
th
 century 
and capturing Mecca and Medina in the beginning of 19
th
 century.
81
 Also, they removed the 
citation of the name of the Sultan from Friday prayers after invading the two holy cities. By 
this means, they challenged and undermined the Ottoman authority in the region.
82
 During 
that process, they benefited from the political upheavals and series of wars which shattered 
the Ottoman center during the reign of Selim III. Additionally, unlike most of the local 
leaders in the periphery, Saudi leaders did not recognize the legitimacy of the Ottoman 
Empire in the region, and aimed to base their authority and legitimacy on the holy cities by 
expelling the Ottomans from the region. By this way, Saudis aimed to establish a state 
which was compatible with the teachings of the Wahhabi movement.
83
 
Therefore, we can argue that the Wahhabi movement was born into a period which 
was full of political upheavals and military defeats for the Ottoman Empire. These 
drawbacks shaped the Ottoman policy towards the Wahhabi movement which will be 
explained in detail in the next chapters.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT 
 
2.1. The Founder of the Wahhabi Movement: 
 
The founder of Wahhabi movement, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, was born in 
al-Uyayna in Najd region of Saudi Arabia in 1703. His family known as Al Mushrraf was 
the member of the tribe of Banu Tamim and a part of the religious class in the region. His 
mufti grandfather in Najd and his qadi father in al-Uyayna were among the representatives 
of Hanbalism, so Abd al-Wahhab received his first education in accordance with Hanbali 
teaching from his father.
84
 Later, he left his home town and went to Mecca, Medina, Basra 
and Aleppo to study with religious scholars. Before the death of his father, Abd al-Wahhab 
came to Huraymila in 1738 where his father had to settle after he was dismissed from his 
duty because of his disagreement with the new ruler of al-Uyayna.
85
 After his arrival to 
Huraymila, he wrote his first book about tawhid which means unity of God, and tried to 
spread his ideas. Yet, he received criticism from some people and even from his father and 
brother because of the ideas promoted in his book.
86
 This is why, Abd al-Wahhab could 
actively start to spread his ideas only after the death of his father in 1740, and he moved to 
al-Uyayna again in 1743 as a result of assassination attempts against him.
87
 After his arrival 
to al-Uyayna, he convinced the ruler of al-Uyayna, Uthman ibn Mu‘ammar, to support his 
ideas by suggesting him taking control of the whole Najd. Thus, he could start to 
disseminate his religious views among local tribes. Yet, he confronted significant 
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opposition because of his ideas about destroying graveyards.
88
 Therefore, he had to leave 
al-Uyayna, and came to al-Dir’iyya in 1744 which was under the control of Muhammad ibn 
Saud. This situation marked the beginning of a political alliance with the Saudi family, and 
this alliance continued from 1744 to the death of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 
1792.
89
  
 
2.2. The Sources and Discourse of the Wahhabi Doctrine: 
 
2.2.1. The Sources of Wahhabi Doctrine: 
 
Apart from his life and political alliance, the sources of the Wahhabi doctrine are 
crucial to be addressed in order to understand the discourse and nature of the Wahhabi 
movement. Yet, the studies indicate that there are various outlooks about it.  
In Ahmet Vehbi Ecer’s book, the author argues that the roots of the Wahhabi 
ideology are based on Kharijites, Hanbalites, Zahiris and Ibn Taymiyya. These are the fuels 
of the Wahhabi movement, and Wahhabi doctrine was influenced by their way of thinking 
when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab developed his doctrine. Therefore, the author draws 
the picture of similarities among Kharijites, Hanbalites, Zahiris, Ibn Taymiyya and 
Wahhabism. To support his claim, the author explains how they view the Qur’an, and how 
they understand Islam. Firstly, the author indicates that the only sources they accept are the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah and Hadith. Secondly, he demonstrates that they rejected Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh) and analogy (qiyas). That’s because, according to them, the Qur’an 
should be taken into consideration with its direct or apparent meaning. In other words, there 
is no metaphoric or allegoric meaning in the Qur’an. Also, they think that human reasoning 
should not be applied because it would distort the meaning of the Qur’an which is the word 
of God. For this reason, they are against the use of human reasoning. Thirdly, the author 
puts forward that they are very strict about their views, and they tend to use violence to 
people who do not share the same religious ideas while being fellow Muslims. Fourthly, the 
author underlines that although there are some differences among fundamentalists (for 
                                                          
88 Kurşun, Necid ve Ahsa’da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devleti’nin Ortaya Çıkışı, 18.   
89 David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (Newyork: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 19. 
25 
 
instance, Kharijites only accept the Qur’an as a source and reject all other traditions, 
whereas the Hanbelites do not reject the qiyas completely, they are mainly sharing a similar 
strict understanding of Islam.
90
      To illustrate, according to Abd al-Wahhab, if a person 
would abandon or deny one of the religious obligations, the person ought to be killed 
because this person becomes an infidel.
91
 Lastly, the author states that Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab shared same ideas with Ibn Taymiyya about bid‘at, i.e. being innovations which 
never existed in original Islam and violated the notion of the oneness of God. For instance, 
graveyards, the practice of visiting graveyards, mosque minarets and interior decorations 
within a mosque were considered as bid‘at. This is why he commanded his followers to 
destroy graveyards, even the graveyards of the Prophet’s companions. He justified the 
destruction of graveyards by arguing that graveyards were used as temples in the past, and 
it could be used again in the same way. To prevent such a possibility, they should be 
destroyed.
92
  
Like Vehbi Ecer, Zekeriya Kurşun argues that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was 
heavily influenced by Ibn Taymiyya as well as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya. Morever, he 
points out that due to the fact that Wahhabism shared some similarities with the Kharijites 
and Zahiris about the idea of going back to the origin of Islam by only referring to the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah, it led some scholars to make analogies between them.93 
Apart from Ahmet Vehbi Ecer and Zekeriya Kurşun, Michael Cook examines the 
sources of the Wahhabi movement in his article. He firstly indicates and compares the 
contradictory travel accounts of Abd al-Wahhab with each other to see whether these travel 
accounts show anything about the sources of his doctrine. Then, he examines the writers 
who had impacts on his thoughts. By this way, he tries to see whether these writers could 
be the sources of Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine.94 Therefore, Cook argues that his travel 
accounts do not indicate the sources of his doctrine.
95
 Yet, the references he used in his 
works show where he got inspiration for his doctrine. He states that Abd al-Wahhab did not 
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use the founder of Hanbalism, Ibn Hanbal, in his doctrine because the author states that 
“despite their common heritage, the older Hanbalite authorities had doctrinal concerns very 
different from those of Wahhabis”. He adds that “his attitude may owe more to his youthful 
flirtation with Mu’tazilism than to his lifelong allegiance to Hanbalism.” However, the 
most influential scholars on Abd al- Wahhab appear to be two Hanbelite scholars, Ibn 
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, from 14th century.
96
 
On the other hand, although the studies above point out the influence of Ibn 
Taymiyya on Abd al-Wahhab’s thought, Fatih M. Şeker proposes that although he was 
based his ideas on Ibn Taymiyya, he exceeded the limits which were determined in the 
ideas of Ibn Taymiyya about bid‘at, infidels, intercession (shafa‘ah; şefaat) and Islamic 
mysticism or Sufism. For instance, although Ibn Taymiyya did not completely ban 
graveyards and was not categorically against Sufism, Abd al-Wahhab was completely 
against all these things.
97
 
Likewise Şeker, Hamid Algar claims that although Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas are 
associated with Ibn Taymiyya, there are fundamental distinctions among them. To 
illustrate, Abd al-Wahhab was completely against Sufism. Yet, Ibn Taymiyya demonstrated 
a critical approach only to the particular elements of Sufism.
98
 The author even puts 
forward that “Wahhabism is essentially a movement without pedigree; it came out of 
nowhere in the sense not only of emerging from the wastelands of Najd, but also its lack of 
substantial precedent in Islamic history”.99 
Therefore, it can be concluded that although Ibn Taymiyya is commonly regarded 
as a person whom Abd al-Wahhab was mostly interested in, the studies indicate that there 
are actually diverging ideas among scholars about the sources of the Wahhabi doctrine. In 
my opinion, Wahhabism seems to have been influenced by other madhabs mentioned 
above in addition to people like Ibn Taymiyya. Yet, although it shares some similarities 
with them, it doesn’t appear to be their continuation. It developed its own structure, and 
produced its own discourse by integrating some of their elements into itself. This is why I 
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do not think that it represents a phenomenon without substantial precedent in Islamic 
history, as Algar states in his book. Otherwise it would mean the rejection of the whole 
legacy of Islam which shaped and affected the region throughout history, like the Wahhabis 
are doing with their discourse, which will be explained in the following pages. 
2.2.2. Discourse of the Wahhabi Doctrine: 
 
Apart from the sources of the doctrine, the discourse of the Wahhabi doctrine which 
was generated by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab is important to be analyzed. Firstly, it is 
important to underline that Wahhabis did not call themselves “Wahhabi”.  The term of 
“Wahhabi” was coined by the opponents of the Wahhabis to reprove the ideology of the 
movement.
100
 On the other hand, “Wahhabis themselves prefer the titles al-Muwahhidun or 
Ahl al-Tawhid, “the asserters of the divine unity”. But precisely this self-awarded title 
springs from a desire to lay exclusive claim to the principle of tawhid that is the foundation 
of Islam itself; it implies a dismissal of all other Muslims as tainted by shirk.”101 In addition 
to these titles, they also used the titles of Ahl al-Hadith or Salafi which reflects their 
traditional religious method. The reason why they chose these titles was that by restoring 
Islam, they aimed to turn Islam to its original version which was called as Ahl al-Sunna
102
, 
so they had a purist approach towards Islam.
103
 Moreover, they named their doctrine as 
Da‘watu’t-Tawhid, Da‘watu al-Muhammadiya, al-Da‘watu al-Salafiya or just Al-
Da‘wah.104  
Besides, Abd al-Wahhab based his ideas on the conviction that Islam was started to 
be spread by Prophet Muhammad when the idea of the oneness of God was hitherto 
unknown to people. Also, Abd al-Wahhab attached much importance on a hadith reporting 
that Prophet Muhammad mentioned a future time period in which people would become 
unfamiliar with Islam again. Therefore, Abd al-Wahhab associated this hadith with his own 
lifetime, drawing an analogy between the people of pre-Islamic times and people in his 
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period by defining them as “the ignorant” (jahil). By this means, he constructed the core of 
his discourse which can be defined as a revival of Islam after its degeneration as having 
been told in the hadith.
105
 
Moreover, Abd al-Wahhab categorically opposed Sufism and Shiism, and his 
discourse led them to be exposed to the attacks of the Wahhabis.
106
 His religious position 
generated Wahhabism as a new madhab, which rejected the whole legacy of Islam, other 
madhabs and the traditions of Muslims by labelling them as bid‘at.107 By this way, 
Wahhabis claim that they aim to restore Islam by fighting bid‘at in it. This is why, they 
consider other Muslims as superstitious too because in their eyes they are not practicing the 
true Islam.
108
 They even labelled non-Wahhabis as infidels, and this even included 
Muslims.
109
 Thus, not only non-Muslims, but also Muslims who did not accept the 
Wahhabi doctrine became the targets of their jihad.
110
  
 
2.3. The Spread of the Wahhabi Movement: 
 
The arrival of Muhammad ibn Abd al -Wahhab to al-Dir’iyya in 1745 marked the 
beginning of a political alliance between him and the Saudi family, and it gave a significant 
impetus for the spread of the Wahhabi movement.
111
 Since then, in a similar way he 
convinced the ruler of al-Uyayna, Uthman ibn Mu’ammar, he also convinced Muhammad 
ibn Saud to support his ideas by suggesting him to take control of the whole Najd.
112
With 
this political alliance, the nature of the movement and its leadership structure changed. The 
movement was not only a religious movement anymore, but also became a political 
movement.
113
 This is why Abd al-Wahhab started to share the leadership of the movement 
with the Saudi family. While he stayed as a religious leader, the Saudi family assumed the 
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political leadership of the movement.
114
 After his death in 1792, Saudi family monopolized 
both political and religious leadership of Wahhabism.
115
 
After the formation of the alliance, these two leaders cooperated with each other to 
circulate the movement in the region which provided territorial expansions for the Saudi 
family,
116
 and the studies indicate that various factors paved the way for the spread of 
Wahhabi movement in the region. To illustrate, Selda Güner proposes that Hanbalism and 
the idea of jihad played a crucial role in the spread of Wahhabism in the region.
117
 Since 
Hanbalism was widespread among the people of Najd and the members of the Saudi family 
were Hanbalites as well, the teachings of Abd al-Wahhab could easily diffuse among them. 
In addition to the Hanbali madhab, the epistles and letters of Abd-al Wahhab were also 
influential in the spread of movement in the region. Besides, Wahhabism fitted very well to 
the local Arab mentality because before the birth of Islam in the region, the most significant 
two components of the means of living were plundering, ghazw, and raiding among the 
Bedouins.
118
 After the spread of Islam, these pre-Islamic features continued to exist among 
the Arab tribes. Moreover, Islam turned raids into the ideal of jihad. Thus, Islam brought 
raids under the cloak of Islam, and it gave legitimacy for the conquests of the Arabs in the 
region. Therefore, by asserting the idea of extension and by turning the raids into big 
conquests, Islam enlarged the scope of raids and brought a religious obligation to its 
nature.
119
 Therefore, when Wahhabis tried to spread their ideas about religion, first they 
invited the Arab tribes to their movement by sending epistles written by Abd al-Wahhab. If 
they did not accept the invitation, then Wahhabis attacked and took their lands and goods as 
booty for themselves, which motivated the followers of Wahhabis for the next attacks. This 
is why the author states that they used the idea of jihad to justify their attacks against the 
others. 
120
 
Similarly, Vehbi Ecer thinks that Wahhabism promoted their violent local traditions 
by giving permission to plunder and killing under the clock of jihad because according to 
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him, throughout history, geographical conditions nurtured heroic features and fighting 
skills of Bedouins which turned them into raiders. Therefore, the already existing plunderer 
character of Bedouins led them to embrace and join the Wahhabi movement easily, and 
their warrior character helped the movement expand rapidly in the region.
121
 
Like Güner and Ecer, Algar shares comparable ideas about jihad. He states that 
“Muhammad b. Sa‘ud pledged his aid to Muhammad b.‘Abd al-Wahhab in waging jihad 
against all who deviated from his understanding of tauhid”, and in return, Abd al-Wahhab 
ensured him about gaining more economic profit than collecting taxes via jihad.
122
 Thus, 
“the stage was thus set for a campaign of killing and plunder all across Arabia”, and  “In 
1159/1746, the Wahhabi-Saudi state made a formal proclamation of jihad against all who 
did not share their understanding of tauhid, for they counted as non-believers, guilty of 
shirk and apostasy.”123 
Furthermore, Emine Ö. Evered analyzes in her article the narrative of Wahhabi 
movement through the account of the Ottoman statesman and historian Ahmet Cevdet 
Pasha.
124
 She states that Abd al-Wahhab used religion to legitimize plunder because 
plunder was part of a Bedouin culture, and it provided a solid base to spread the movement 
easily among them. By this way, they were motivated and even entitled to attack other 
Muslims.
125
 
On the other hand, Madawi Al-Rasheed criticizes most of the accounts pointing 
only the economic benefit behind the success of expansion. He claims that although the 
idea of economic benefit from the raids and coercion helped Saudis take the support of the 
tribes, these were not enough to provide such level of expansion. According to him, this 
view neglects the spiritual importance of the Wahhabi doctrine which also played a 
significant role in convincing people to join the movement by offering salvation as a 
spiritual award.
126
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Apart from the abovementioned factors, the overall presence of Bedouin tribes and 
political conditions in Najd seem to have helped Wahhabis to expand in the region as well. 
To explain, with the aim of taking tribes under their control, their army needed resources 
like men and camels which would provide their army the ability to move in the desert. 
Bedouins provided them all these required logistical resources.
127
 Besides, there was no 
political unity among the tribes in Najd; although some of them fought against the 
Wahhabis, while others supported them. Therefore, the tribes could not form a united front 
to stand against the Wahhabis in the region, and some of them stood with Wahhabis 
willingly or by fear.
128
Furthermore, the Ottoman control was limited in Najd, and this 
facilitated the spread of the Wahhabi movement in the second half of the 18
th
 century.
129
 
It can be deduced from the abovementioned views that there were various factors 
helping the spread of Wahhabism and Saudi expansion in the region. Yet, although Madawi 
al-Rasheed points out a different side of the story, all authors seem to agree on the role of 
jihad in the spread of Wahhabi movement and consolidation of Saudi power with the 
territorial acquisitions in the region. As Wahhabis deployed jihad as a means to achieve 
their cause, their different envision of Islam provided a solid base to separate themselves 
from other Muslims, and to justify their actions against them. Thus, they could easily 
spread their movement in the region, and the discourse of Wahhabi doctrine played crucial 
role under such circumstances.   
The spread of the Wahhabi movement could be explained in terms of three phases. 
In the first phase of their expansion, Wahhabism firstly influenced the Arab city-dwellers, 
but then took the support of Bedouin Arabs too.
130
 Yet, to be able to achieve this goal, they 
followed two ways. Firstly, they trained numerous Wahhabi sympathizers and sent letters 
written by Abd-al Wahhab to regional tribes to invite them to accept their version of Islam. 
By this way, they aimed to earn new followers and tried to integrate them into their 
movement by taking their allegiances during the early years of Wahhabism. Secondly, they 
attacked and invaded the regions who did not pledge their allegiances by accepting 
Wahhabi invitation to their religion after accumulating some power.  Also, they used 
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religion as a tool to justify their attacks.
131
 Thus, starting from 1744, Wahhabis gradually 
took the allegiance of the tribes in Najd first to spread their movement,
132
 and Najd became 
territorialized by gathering all tribes under the roof of Wahhabi domination.
133
 After Najd, 
Wahhabis brought the tribes in Central Arabia, ‘Asir and some areas in Yemen under their 
control. As a result, fifteen years after their official declaration of jihad in 1746, they 
annexed major territories in the Arabian Peninsula.
134
 Eventually, “approximately after a 
thirty years of slow and disorganized period of spread, Wahhabi movement gained 
momentum with the control of whole Najd by Saudi family.”135 During these territorial 
expansions, Saudi family benefited from the Wahhabi doctrine thanks to the epistles written 
and sent by Abd al-Wahhab to the tribes to convince them to join the Wahhabi 
movement.
136
 Thus, “Wahhabism impregnated the Sa‘udi leadership with a new force, 
which proved to be crucial for the consolidation and expansion of the Sa‘udi rule.”137 
Moreover, it opened the way for the formation of a politically centralized region.
138
 
After the control of Najd, the second and the most critical stage of Wahhabi 
expansion started in the 1770s, when many tribes were put under the firm grip of Abd al-
Wahhab-Saudi leadership. B this means, the movement evolved into a regional power, and 
it began to expand over neighboring regions during the last quarter of 18
th
 century.
139
 This 
critical stage of the Wahhabi expansion occurred when Abd-al Aziz came to power after the 
death of his father in 1765, Muhammad ibn Saud. As a leader, he was more dedicated to the 
Wahhabi cause than his father was.
140
 Also, unlike his father, he was more aggressive, and 
did not care not to draw the attention of the Ottoman Empire during his reign.
141
 From the 
date he came to power to the end of his reign in 1803, he conducted military campaigns to 
the neighboring regions of Najd.
142
 To illustrate, “in 1187/1773, he conquered Riyadh, and 
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some seventeen years later began a more significant expansion of his realm by setting his 
sights on the Hijaz.”143 Thus, he prevailed over the most powerful tribe of Najd, the Bani 
Khalid.
144
 Besides Riyadh, he carried out attacks on Al-Ahsa between 1784 and 1793, Iraq 
between 1784 and 1798 and other coastal regions of the Persian Gulf like Qatar between 
1787 and 1788 and Kuwait between 1793 and 1795. He also attacked regions of Bilad al-
Sham and the Hijaz during the same period.
145
 In 1795, he was able to take full control of 
Al-Ahsa
146
, and it enabled him to expand outside Najd towards the regions in the Persian 
Gulf 
147
like Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.
148
 These conquests provided significant 
resources to afford the economic needs of a newly emerging state.
149
 Moreover, like Al-
Ahsa, by taking Bahrain, Oman and Muscat under the influence of Wahhabis in 1800-1803, 
he aimed to benefit from the trade in the Persian Gulf in East Arabia as well as increasing 
his revenue by taking zakat
150
 from these regions.
151
  
While Abd al-Wahhab sent epistles to the tribes in the region, he also tried to start 
negotiations by offering money to the Sharif of Mecca around the 1733s to take his 
permission for pilgrimage to Mecca with his companions. Yet, his offer was refused, and 
the Sharifian authorities put Wahhabi Ulama into prison, who were accused of heresy by 
the qadi and the Sharif of Mecca. As a retaliation, Wahhabis attacked pilgrimage routes 
which generated obstacles for pilgrims and resulted in significant economic losses for the 
Hijaz, because Mecca was benefiting from pilgrimage every year.  This is why, the Sharif 
of Mecca, Sharif Surur, took a step in 1770 to authorize their entrance to Mecca to provide 
safety for pilgrimage routes. In return, he asked them to pay a tax like the Shiites were 
doing. However, Wahhabis found this proposal deeply insulting because of their 
comparison with the Shiites, so they kept attacking to pilgrimage routes. From 1794 
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onwards, Abd al-Aziz carried out direct attacks on the Hijaz
152
 because “…one of the 
driving forces behind Wahhabi expansion was control of access to Mecca and Medina. 
Afraid of Ottoman retaliations, the Wahhabis did not attack Mecca and Medina at first but 
expanded toward the Gulf. Once they were strong enough economically and militarily, they 
turned to Hijaz.”153The death of Abd al-Wahhab in 1792 did not affect their expansion, and 
they continued to spread over Syria, Iraq and Hijaz after him.
154
  
In 1802, under the leadership of Abd al-Aziz, Wahhabis sacked Karbala, the holy 
city of Shiites in Iraq.
155
 After Karbala, Wahhabis directed their attacks to Hijaz.
156
 Yet, 
Abd al-Aziz was assassinated by the Ottomans in 1803
157
, and he was succeeded by his 
son, Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz whose reign lasted between 1803 and 1814.
158
 Thus, we come to 
the third phase of the expansion of Wahhabi movement started. He was the most prominent 
figure who enabled Saudis to expand over the Arabia. During his reign, the Ottoman 
Empire tried to prevent Wahhabi expansion via governors of Baghdad and Damascus 
because the Saudi influence reached to Baghdad, Ahsa and Hijaz.
159
 
He invaded Taif in 1802, then Mecca in 1803 and Medina in 1804.
160
 But the Sharif 
of Mecca, Sharif Ghalib, took Mecca back within the same year. However, Wahhabis 
reoccupied Mecca in 1806, and both holy city, Mecca and Medina, stayed under their 
domination until 1812.
161
 Finally, under the command of the Ottoman Empire, the governor 
of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha sent his army led by his son against the Wahhabis in 1811 
to retake these two holy cities, and remove them from the region. Tosun Pasha, the son of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha, took Medina in 1812, Mecca and Taif in 1813. Yet, after the death 
of Saudi leader, Saud ibn Abd- al Aziz in 1814, his son, Abd Allah ibn Saud, succeeded 
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him. When he came to power, he also he had an intention to attack to Medina again. To 
terminate the Wahhabis once and for all, Muhammad Ali Pasha appointed his other son, 
Ibrahim Pasha to organize another campaign against them in 1816. He took control of their 
capital, al-Dir’iyya, in 1818, imprisoned Abd Allah ibn Saud and his entourage and sent 
them to Istanbul where they were executed. Thus, at this point the Wahhabi movement 
ended in favor of the Ottoman Empire
162
, and first Saudi-Wahhabi emirate became 
dissolved after the Ottomans took control over al-Dir’iyya.163  
Yet, in 1824, Wahhabis gained power again. “After the withdrawal of Egyptian 
forces there was an attempt to reestablish Sa’udi-Wahhabi authority in 1824 when Turki 
ibn Abd Allah, the son of the beheaded Sa‘udi ruler, returned to Riyadh, the south of 
Dir’iyyah.”164 This time, Riyadh became their center instead of al-Dir’iyya, and the second 
Wahhabi-Saudi rule lasted from 1824 to 1891.
165
 In the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the 
Saudis gained power again, and their third emirate got in the way of being a fully 
developed state between 1902 and 1932,
166
 and finally, they established the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in 1932.
167
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS REACTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
AGAINST THE WAHHABI MOVEMENT 
 
3.1. The Political Reaction of the Ottoman Empire Against the Wahhabi Movement: 
 
As mentioned before, with the arrival of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab to al-Dir’iyya 
in 1745, a political alliance was sealed between Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud, 
and this alliance initiated the spread of the Wahhabi movement.
168
 Thus, the Wahhabis 
started to annex substantial areas in Arabia,
169
 and they drew the Ottoman Empire’s 
attention toward their movement over time. During this process, the Meccan Sharif played 
an important role, since for the first time; the Ottoman Empire was apprised by the Sharif 
of Mecca, Masud, about the activities of the Wahhabis in Najd in 1749. Thus, İstanbul 
learned that the Wahhabis were spreading their ideas among the Arab tribes, which were 
contrary to the teachings of the four madhabs in Sunni Islam.
170
  Even, in order to make his 
voice heard by the Ottoman center and receive its support, the Sharif obtained a fatwa from 
the high Ulama of Mecca when he sent the letter to inform Istanbul about the Wahhabi 
expansion in the region.
171
 
 Yet, Kurşun states that although the first reaction to the Wahhabis came from the 
Ulama of Basra, Mecca and Medina, the Wahhabi incident did not raise the same reaction 
among the Ulama of İstanbul. They thought that it was similar to any other movement 
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around the empire, and since it did not pose any immediate threat, they believed that this 
situation would be resolved through political channels instead of religious solutions. This is 
why, Kurşun argues that the Ottoman state did not attach the same importance as other 
Ulama in the region and did not engage in considerable efforts against them
172
 . Also, 
Güner draws the attention to the shaykh al-islams of the empire. For her, what is interesting 
is that shaykh al-islams did not try to produce any counter arguments on the basis of 
religion to combat Wahhabism even though they attended the meetings and proposed some 
ideas to prevent the Wahhabi threat. According to Güner, the reason why the shaykh al-
islams did not argue in religious terms on the movement is that the discourses of the 
Ottoman Ulama could not contradict the politics of the Sublime Porte because the religion 
and politics were closely intertwined in the Ottoman Empire.
173
 
The question of how the central government of the Ottoman Empire reacted 
politically to the Wahhabi incident is worth analyzing so as to understand how the Ottoman 
official perception of the Wahhabi movement evolved from its beginning to the temporary 
end in 1818. It also provides significant information about how the Wahhabi movement 
managed to expand and spread in the region. 
 
3.1.1. The Wahhabi Movement as a Regional Problem: 
 
On the Ottoman side, the news of Wahhabi as a phenomenon reached İstanbul 
during the reign of Mahmud I (r. 1730-1754) with the letter of the Sharif Masud in 1749, 
and the central government started to pay attention to the Wahhabi movement. Meanwhile, 
the Wahhabis launched their first military campaigns to spread Wahhabism and to plunder 
neighboring tribes around al-Dir’iyya in Najd in 1745. As an answer to Sharif Masud in 
1750, Sultan Mahmud I ordered him to persuade Abd al-Wahhab to alter his ideas, but in 
the case that he did not change his views, the Sharif was ordered to put an end to the 
Wahhabis and remove their leader. In addition to the Meccan Sharif, the Sultan also 
advised and ordered the governors of Basra, Bagdad and Jeddah to cooperate with the 
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Meccan Sharif to tackle with the Wahhabi movement.
174
 However, Evered puts forward 
that “these orders were never conveyed, as correspondence with the Ottoman state was 
unreliable and the Ottoman administration was too preoccupied with other wars and 
rebellions to follow up on the Wahhabi movement.”175  
But in contrast to Evered’s claim, those times were relatively peaceful times for the 
Ottoman empire compared to the European countries. This is because during the reign of 
Osman III (1754-1757) and the reign of Mustafa III (1757-1774), the Ottoman empire had 
already acquired peaceful conditions thanks to the treaty of Belgrad in 1739 in Europe. In 
addition, Seven Years’ War occurred in Europe in 1756, and the European countries were 
fighting with each other. During this process, the Ottoman government conducted neutral 
policy towards them, and considered their fights beneficial for its interests. Likewise, 
during the reign of Mustafa III, these peaceful conditions continued, and this situation even 
enabled the Ottoman economy to reach an adequate level, as well. However, this situation 
continued until the war with Russia broke out in 1768, because the war (1768-1774) 
deteriorated the existed conditions.
176
Therefore, when the political conditions of the 
Ottoman Empire are taken into consideration, it can be said that the Ottoman Empire did 
not consider Wahhabi movement as a serious problem. It underestimated the movement 
even though the Empire had the capability to halt the spread of the Wahhabis. 
Additionally, Güner’s statement provides an explanation for how the Wahhabi 
movement spread in the region. She states that “according to the common view, Ottomans 
did not attach importance to the situation because they thought that it was just a usual 
Bedouin plunder which was occurring in the region all the time.”177 Furthermore, Şeker 
puts forward another reason explaining how the Wahhabism spread in the region. He states 
that the Ottomans did not give sufficient weight to the Wahhabi agitation because they 
drew parallels between Wahhabi and Kadızadeli movements. He also underlines that it was 
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only during the reign of Abdulhamid I (r.1774-1789) that the Sultan realized the gravity of 
the Wahhabi threat. However, unlike the Sultan, other state officials underrated the 
movement because they did not consider it as a political movement in the first place.
178
 In 
line with Şeker’s statement, Kurşun puts forward that like the Wahhabis, their opponents 
did not anticipate that the movement would spread rapidly over time. By keeping the 
movement inside Najd for a considerable time, the Wahhabis did not get the attention of 
other political authorities bordering around them. Also, they were not thinking radically 
different from mainstream Sunni Islam about the conditions of founding a state or being a 
state ruler. This is why, Kurşun claims, that in the beginning at least, the movement did not 
possess any major political aims, and did not appear to have posed any serious threats to the 
Islamic world.
179
 
Overall, when the political conditions of the Ottoman Empire, and the statements of 
Güner, Şeker, and Kurşun are taken into consideration together, it can be said that all these 
claims go along with one another. They demonstrate a common result about the Ottoman 
perception on the Wahhabi movement that the Ottoman Empire did not evaluate the 
Wahhabi movement as a serious political problem. Rather, it considered the movement a 
minor and usually local problem, and due to this, the Ottoman Empire did not pay a serious 
attention to it. 
Moreover, the negative response of the Sublime Porte to Sharif Surur’s call for aid 
against the Wahhabi threat in 1776, and the statements of the local governors also prove 
that the Ottoman administration in general did not evaluate the Wahhabis as a serious 
political problem for the empire unlike Sharif Surur. To explain, in the 1770s the 
Wahhabis’ attacks on pilgrim routes increased, and this situation brought out an urgent 
necessity for providing the security of the pilgrim routes for Sharif Surur. The reason why 
he became alarmed was that the Wahhabis launched attacks on the pilgrims, and this 
situation engendered economic losses for Hijaz since Mecca was economically utilizing 
pilgrims every year. This is why the Sharif Surur had to take a step to ensure the security of 
the pilgrimage routes in 1770. He gave his permission to their entrance in Mecca, if they 
paid tax for pilgrimage like the Shiites did for the pilgrimage. However, his proposal could 
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not solve the problem because the Wahhabis felt insulted due to their comparison with the 
Shiites. As a result, they maintained their attacks to the caravans of pilgrims around Hijaz, 
and the Sharif Surur needed to ask help from Istanbul in 1776. He was probably worried of 
a possible Wahhabi invasion of Mecca and Medina.
180
  Yet, İstanbul did not send any 
military help to Sharif Surur. Instead, “after some deliberation, Ottoman authorities decided 
to ask the governors of Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus, and Jeddah to investigate the threat 
and report their findings to the state.” In return, the governors of Jeddah and Damascus 
briefed the central government by reporting that the Wahhabis were not a serious threat 
because Abd al-Wahhab was just a teacher, and he was not a tribal leader, so he did not 
have the power to gather an army to start an uprising against the Ottoman Empire. As a 
result, the Sublime Porte did not send any military contingent to support the Sharif.
181
 
Therefore, with allowing its local governors to carry on their own investigation and 
acting in accordance with their intelligence, Istanbul trusted its local governors more than 
the Sharif himself. Secondly, it proves once again that Istanbul did not consider the 
Wahhabis as a serious problem, and continued to evaluate the problem as an ordinary and 
minor local dispute between the Sharif and the Wahhabis. Besides, another additional 
reason why the central government did not send military help to the Sharif might be the war 
with Russia between 1768-1774. Since the war costed major territorial losses and 
considerable amount of money for the Ottoman empire
182
, it might not have had enough 
resources to send military support to the Sharif.  
Yet, when it came to 1795, the Wahhabi invasion of Al-Ahsa seems the first turning 
point for the Ottoman perception toward the Wahhabi movement since the movement not 
only became a serious political and local problem, but also a regional problem as well by 
expanding its territories into Al-Ahsa. To explain, in 1784, the Wahhabis initiated military 
campaigns towards Al-Ahsa to gain economic profit from its harbor,
183
and took the control 
of the region in 1795.
184
 The Sharifs of Mecca and Medina informed the central 
government, fearing that Mecca and Medina would be the next after the invasion of Al-
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Ahsa in 1795, and increasing the risks for cities like Damascus, Baghdad and Basra as well. 
Likewise, Al-Ahsa which was ruled by a powerful tribe, Bani Khalid, in the name of the 
Ottoman empire, was an important region for the Ottomans due to its strategic location and 
high trading volume
185
. As a result, the invasion of Al-Ahsa led the Ottomans to take 
concrete measures to fight against the Wahhabis by engaging other tribes in the region.
186
 
Yet, the first direct confrontation of the Ottoman army with the Wahhabis took place in 
1798
187
, and the central government did not send any military unit to help the Sharifs 
immediately. Therefore, it took some time for the interference of the central government.
188
 
In the meantime, Sharif Ghalib failed in military strikes carried out without the approval of 
İstanbul to prevent an imminent invasion of the Hijaz by the Wahhabis. Because of this, he 
wrote a letter to request the central government to send the governor of Baghdad, Suleiman 
Pasha, to take hold of the Wahhabis and notified the government about Wahhabis’ 
increasing power and their blockade on food supplies. 
However, it seems that the central government did not pay attention to the Sharif 
letter although it heeded its governor’s requests. It was only after After Cezzar Ahmet 
Pasha, governor of Damascus, and Sidon, informed the central government about the 
Wahhabis’ intention to attack Mecca, and apprised about the gravity of the Wahhabi threat 
much bigger than what the Sharif told did the central government decide to hold a critical 
meeting to discuss specifically about the Wahhabi incident.
189
Therefore, it seems that one 
of the reasons why the Ottoman government did not send necessary help on time was again 
due to its high reliance on his governors unlike the Meccan Sharif, which also indicates its 
distrust towards him
190
 Secondly, the other reason might be the proposition of diverging 
ideas by the Sublime Porte functionaries on handling the Wahhabi problem during this 
critical meeting.  
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In the meeting, one group of dignitaries agreed on eliminating the Wahhabi threat 
by military means, defining the Wahhabis as Kharijites because of their intention to invade 
Mecca. Another group proposed that Abd al-Wahhab was just informing people in 
accordance with the rules in Islam, and actually posed no threat. The last group evaluated 
the issue as a conflict between the Sharif and the Wahhabis, i.e. as a local problem to be 
solved, and suggested the investigation of the governor of Baghdad.
191
 As a result, it can be 
said that the Ottoman empire started to consider the Wahhabi movement as a serious 
political problem since it held a critical meeting to specifically discuss about the Wahhabi 
incident. Also, the central government acted in accordance with the views of the third 
group, and asked the governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Pasha, to send a report on this issue. 
 When Suleiman Pasha informed the central government about the unexpectedly 
dangerous nature of the Wahhabi threat, Istanbul ordered him to attack the heartland of the 
Wahhabis, al-Dir’iyya, to wipe them out.192 At first, Suleiman Pasha did not carry out the 
order pointing out the inadequacy of his army against the Wahhabis in the desert alone, and 
the necessity to protect his region from them. Yet, after almost three years’ 
correspondences, he had to comply with the order because of the Wahhabi presence near 
Hille in 1798.
193
Despite this threat assessment, the Ottoman Empire at the same time 
played the mediator role to provide a reconciliation ground between the Sharif and the 
Wahhabis.
194
It seems that by acting as a mediator, the Ottoman Empire actually tried to 
gain time to take care of the Wahhabi problem because a few years ago it had already lost 
another battle against Russia (1787-1792). The failure of the Ottoman army resulted in 
major territorial losses leading to Selim’s Nizam-ı Cedid reforms in 1792. These reforms 
also caused heavy costs for the Ottoman Empire.
195
 Additionally, since the Ottoman empire 
were going through a decentralization process, Ayans (local elites) increased their power 
vis a vis the central government. Since the central government needed their cooperation in 
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military and financial matters, it became dependent on ayans over time to conduct its 
battles against its enemies. Especially its dependency increased during the Russian wars of 
1768-74 and 1787-92.
196
 Moreover, around those times, Selim III was also trying to 
reinforce his central authority against powerful Ayans, and to suppress the rebellious acts of 
some of the local powers as well. 
197
Therefore, due to these internal and external problems 
and lack of resources, the central government had to act as a mediator to resolve the 
problem between the Sharif and the Saud until 1798, by advising both, and using its other 
regional governors as intermediators. 
To explain, the document dated on 24
th
 of May 1797, indicates that Sharif informed 
Istanbul about the conditions to settle the conflict with the Wahhabi leader. Accordingly, 
the Sharif should not prevent the movement of the pilgrims coming from the Saud side 
anymore, nor would Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud intervene with the tribes affiliated with the 
Sharif. As an answer, the central government sent letters and advised both sides to resolve 
the problem in this proposed manner. Moreover, the central government ordered the 
governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Pasha, to communicate with the Sharif, and reconcile him 
with the Wahhabi leader, Abd al-Aziz, to end the military conflict and the quarrel between 
them. The effort of the Sublime Porte to reconcile one another by giving advice, and using 
Suleiman Pasha as intermediator to solve the problem between them
198
 affirms the idea that 
the central government regarded the situation both as a serious political as well as local 
problem.  
Also, another document dated on 29
th
 of March 1798 indicates the same approach. 
The central government once again tried to mediate by advising both the Sharif and Abd al-
Aziz, and by giving orders to its local governors to resolve the problem among them. When 
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the Sharif wrote a letter to the central government about Abd al-Aziz after their conflict 
resulted in a war between them, it responded him by stating that it was inappropriate to 
fight in the holy lands. Also, to put an end to the problem between them, the central 
government advised the Sharif to permit the entrance of Saud’s pilgrims to Mecca to avoid 
offending him. Likewise, when Abd al-Aziz wrote a letter to the central government, it 
recommended him to respect the Sharif by saying that he was descended from the prophet 
Muhammad, and he was still the governor of Mecca. Apart from giving advice to them, the 
Sublime Porte also commanded the governor of Jeddah, Yusuf Pasha, and the governor of 
Damascus, Abdullah Pasha, to reach a common solution to the contention between the 
Sharif and Abd-al-Aziz with an aim to providing order and safety in the Haramayn. Yet, in 
the end, the reconciliation attempts of the central government failed.
199
  
However, at the end of  almost three years’ correspondence, when it became plain 
that efforts of mediation failed, finally Suleiman Pasha had to comply with the order of the 
central government due to the Wahhabi presence near Hille in 1798.
200
 Therefore, Suleiman 
Pasha initiated military attacks, and had the help of the tribes such as the Muntafiq, 
Shammar and Zafir in 1798 to regain Al-Ahsa and Qatif from the Wahhabis.
201
 to compel 
the Saudi leader for negotiations with the ultimate aim to conclude peace.
202
 However, his 
army which was under the command of his steward (kethüda), Ali Bey, could not be 
successful. As a consequence, Ali Bey had to retreat and signed a truce with the Wahhabis 
for six years in 1799 to provide security for pilgrim caravans. To be able to provide this 
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temporary security, Ali Bey paid a rather heavy price; the entire Al-Ahsa was left to the 
Wahhabis.
203
 
To sum up, this process reveals that until Suleiman Pasha complied with the order 
of the central government to attack the Wahhabis in 1798, the central government did 
nothing but endeavor to mediate the dispute as well as the military conflict between them 
since it was unable to intervene the Wahhabis due to its bad political and economic 
conditions mentioned before. Meanwhile, it used a recommendatory language toward both 
sides, and gave them counsel to settle the problem among themselves. Also, it ordered its 
regional governors to communicate and convince Wahhabis to compromise since it aimed 
to establish order in Mecca and Medina, which ultimately indicates that to be able to 
achieve its goals, the Ottoman empire assumed the mediator role as a third party to assuage 
the animosity between them. It may also indicate the efforts of the Ottoman government to 
incorporate the Wahhabis into the Ottoman system.  
Yet, although İstanbul adopted this policy, it did not stay completely neutral since the 
Wahhabis became powerful and expanded into large areas. The order for Suleiman Pasha to 
attack the Wahhabis and compel the Wahhabi leader, Abd al-Aziz, to conclude peace 
implies that the Ottoman Empire was not completely neutral. 
Last but not least, the Wahhabi invasion of Al-Ahsa dramatically changed the perception of 
the Ottoman Empire towards the Wahhabi movement. Because of their expansion towards 
Al-Ahsa, they became a serious political and regional problem for the Empire. Suleiman 
Pasha’s attack to regain Al-Ahsa, and involvement of the other tribes into this confrontation 
prove that the Wahhabi movement was not only a local problem between the Sharif and the 
Wahhabis anymore, but also a regional one. The Wahhabi movement could spread in the 
region and became serious regional threat since the central government did not evaluate the 
movement as a serious political problem in the beginning, and did not take necessary 
precautions against it on time. 
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3.1.2. The Wahhabi Movement as an International and Existential Problem: 
 
Three years after the truce with the Wahhabis, another crucial incident occurred in 
1802, and like the invasion of Al-Ahsa, this also seems to have been another turning point 
for the Ottomans; it seems that it influenced the Ottoman perception about the Wahhabi 
threat in a profound manner. To explain, there was already an ongoing hostility between the 
Wahhabis and the Shiites given that the Wahhabis accused the Shiites with blasphemy as 
they did for the mainstream Sunni Islam, too. As a result, they were attacking the Shiites 
who would participate in the pilgrimage.
204
 Apart from the already existed intricacy 
between them, a conflict occurred between the Wahhabis and the Shiites when a group of 
Wahhabi merchants went to Najaf, a Shiite-majority town in Iraq, to make trade. As a result 
of a disagreement, numerous Wahhabis were killed by the Shiites. When the Wahhabi 
leadership could not reach a common ground with Suleiman Pasha about the punishment of 
the Shiite perpetrators, they used this as an excuse to break the truce with the governor of 
Baghdad and exploited this situation to retaliate against the Shiites. Namely, the Wahhabis 
attacked Karbala in 1802, damaged the graveyard of Imam Hussain, and plundered this 
holy city of the Shiites, while massacring the Shiite population.
205
 These events gave rise to 
a harsh reaction of Iran, and baffled Istanbul as well. In other words, both the Sunnis and 
the Shiites showed major reaction to the Karbala incident; at the same time, however, the 
Wahhabi problem turned into an international issue too.
206
 
The Karbala incident caused a serious crisis between Iran and the Ottoman Empire; 
Suleiman Pasha was warned by Iran about a possible declaration of war if he did not attack 
the Wahhabis and make them pay the price for what they inflicted in Karbala. Because of 
the Iranian threat, Suleiman Pasha first secured the holy relics of Shiites from a possible 
attack of Wahhabis on Najaf, and informed the central government about the situation and 
deliberated on the need to send an emissary to Iran to solve the crisis.
207
 Even though the 
Porte ordered Suleiman Pasha to open a military campaign against the Wahhabis, he could 
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not prevail over them. After the death of Suleiman Pasha in the same year, his steward and 
son-in-law Ali Bey assumed the office, and the central government expected him to 
continue the struggle with the Wahhabis as well.
208
 While the Ottomans were taking 
precautions against the Wahhabi threat in Iraq, Mecca was targeted by the Wahhabi leader, 
Abd al-Aziz
209
, besides; he invaded Taif in 1802.
210
 
As a result of all these problems, the central government held a meeting in 1802, 
and decided to send around 800 hundred selected soldiers to protect Medina temporarily, 
and chose a new governor for Jeddah. Since it lacked the resources to send a big army and 
had to protect the borders, the central government tried to gain time and to produce 
temporary solutions. Additionally, in the meeting, the central government decided to send 
an alim who knew Islamic sects and Arabic well to negotiate with the Wahhabis.
211
For this 
mission, Adem Efendi, from Jerusalem Qadiship was suggested to Istanbul in the 18th of 
November,1802 to admonish the Wahhabis
212
, take back the holy relics seized by the 
Wahhabis during the Karbala attack
213
 and discuss their creeds.
214
 The reason why he was 
chosen was that he was competent in eloquence, and was a quick-witted person.
215
  
Moreover, Kurşun underlines the importance of sending Adem Efendi as emissary 
since it was the first attempt of the Ottomans to negotiate directly with the 
Wahhabis.
216
Also, it seems that the central government had to reach such a decision 
because it was also informed by Ali Pasha about not having enough resources to mobilize 
an army against the Wahhabis.
217
 On the other hand, Evered puts forward that “the 
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authorities sent a scholar instead of a state official for this job, indicating that they viewed 
the Wahhabi movement as a temporary threat, not as a lasting political entity that would 
require state officials for recognition or negotiations.” 218  
Yet, when the circumstances are taken into consideration, the Ottomans tried to 
prevent the expansion of the Wahhabis within the limits of their power; because although 
they were unable to send a big army because of deficient resources, they at least decided to 
send around 800 hundred selected soldiers to protect Medina, and chose a new governor for 
Jeddah in the meeting. Also, it seems that the decision of sending an alim to Wahhabis 
points out that the Karbala incident tremendously changed the Ottoman perception towards 
the Wahhabis. Since the Karbala incident caused a crisis with Iran, it became a much more 
serious political issue turning to an international problem for the Ottoman Empire as well. 
Besides its political aspects, with the Karbala incident, the movement was not only a 
political problem for the Ottomans anymore, but also became a religious problem. For 
instance, in order to convince them on a religious basis, they decided to send an Ulama as 
emissary instead of a state official. This was also another impact of the Karbala incident in 
the perception of the Ottoman Empire towards the Wahhabis since it was the central 
government’s first attempt to negotiate with the Wahhabis directly.  It can be deduced that 
if the central government considered it as a temporary threat as Evered stated, it would not 
have sent an alim as emissary to negotiate with them. Yet, although the Wahhabi problem 
was a major threat for the Sublime Porte, it considered the movement a less dangerous 
threat in relation to the aggression originating from its European neighbors. This is why, 
until it had enough power to crush them, it tried to prevent their expansion in the region.   
The general political conditions of the Ottoman Empire should be taken into 
consideration as well in order to understand why the Ottomans could not send a full-
fledged army to defeat the Wahhabis. The crisis with the Wahhabis after 1798 coincided 
with a period when the Ottomans were engaged in a series of wars with the Russians, 
Austrians, and France. Also, there was significant internal unrest in the Balkans because of 
the nationalist uprisings during the reign of Selim III. So, at these times, the Ottoman 
Empire was experiencing major political and economic challenges and going through very 
                                                          
218 Evered, “Rereading Ottoman Accounts of Wahhabism as Alternative Narratives: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s Historical 
Survey of the Movement,” 629. 
49 
 
hard times politically and economically. This is why Güner also agrees that the central 
government could not resolve the Wahhabi problem in the region immediately.
219
 
Apart from Adem Efendi, another alim, Hibetullah Efendi, was proposed to be sent 
to the Wahhabis according to a document dated on 22nd of April 1803. He was the qadi of 
Baghdad, and the reasons why he was chosen for this mission were similar to the case of 
Adem Efendi. He was proposed because of his profound knowledge in religious matters. 
Secondly, he was competent in Arabic and oratory skills as well as being the most 
reputable alim among the other Ulama of Baghdad. Lastly, he had witnessed the sack of 
Karbala by the Wahhabis, knew their rhetoric and what they did in that place. This is why 
he was asked to inquire into their superstitious belief, and try to understand their 
intentions.
220
 
Yet, although other documents do not indicate whether Hibetullah Efendi went and 
talked with the Wahhabis, it is certainly known from the documents that Adem Efendi went 
and talked to the Saudi leader. The document dated on 17
th
 of June 1803 indicates that 
Adem Efendi went to talk with Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz.
221
 
When Adem Efendi went to negotiate with Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz in 1803, they first 
came together near Taif, and further meetings were held in Mecca.
222
During the meetings, 
mostly religious topics were discussed like the Wahhabi hostility towards the Shiites and 
especially their attack on Karbala. Yet, at the end of thirteen days, Adem Efendi failed to 
convince him about the principal contradiction of Wahhabism to Sunni Islam.
223
  On the 
other hand, the Wahhabi leader put forward that they were trying to show the true path to 
the Muslims who diverged from the true principle of Islam. Also, as an answer for the 
Karbala attack, he defended himself by saying that the Shiites were not true Muslims 
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anymore since they diverged from Islam with their wrong worship practices. Also, he 
pointed the harassment of the governor of Baghdad as an excuse.
224
 Besides, when Adem 
Efendi was still in the region for negotiations, the Wahhabi leader invaded Mecca on 30
th
 of 
April 1803. After that, Adem Efendi left Mecca, and he informed the central government 
about the situation.
225
 
We can get additional information about these negotiations from an Ahmed Agha, 
who was together with Adem Efendi. Ahmet Agha was assigned by the governor of 
Damascus to accompany Adem Efendi for the meeting sent a letter from Damascus to 
Istanbul to inform about their meeting with the Wahhabi leader. Even though the letter did 
not include too much information about their conversation with the Wahhabi leader, he 
conveyed information about the letter of the central government delivered by Adem Efendi 
to Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz. Also, he wrote about Sharif Ghalib’s escape from Mecca to 
Jeddah, and the appointment of his brother as the Meccan Sharif by the Wahhabis. In 
addition, he reported the Wahhabi takeover of Mecca, the destruction of holy places, his 
observation about the quality and quantity of the Wahhabi army, and urgent need for 
military backing to defend Medina and Jeddah.
226
 However, the central government once 
again had to order the governor of Baghdad and other local governors to deal with the 
Wahhabis because it could not deploy an army directly to send over Wahhabis due to the 
adverse political events at the time as mentioned before. 
Apart from the importance of sending an alim for negotiation with the Wahhabis, 
the Wahhabis’ takeover of Mecca on 30th of April in 1803 227was also another important 
incident since it caused a further change in the perception of the Ottoman Empire towards 
the Wahhabis. To explain, in one of the documents sent to Istanbul, it was indicated how 
Abd al-Aziz increased his prestige by subordinating the rebel tribes previously attached to 
the Sharif and by attacking the graveyard of Imam Hussain in Karbala. Besides, it was also 
stated that Abd al-Aziz attacked the tribes all around the Haramayn while manifesting his 
claim on the sultanate, the caliphate, and his bid for being a prophet, and occupied the 
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region around Mecca and Taif. Also, he had the intention to attack Medina as well, and to 
destroy the graveyard of Prophet Muhammad and His Companions. 
228
  
These documents demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire regarded the Wahhabi 
movement more than being a local problem and regional problem. It saw them now direct 
threat to its very existence in the region. The reason for this is that, with the claim of 
sultanate, caliphate and a bid for being prophet, the Wahhabi leader explicitly challenged, 
and revolted against the Ottoman rule and domination. What is more, with these claims and 
the control of Mecca, he undermined the legitimacy and prestige of the Ottoman Empire 
politically and religiously. As a result, the Ottoman Empire continued to deem the Wahhabi 
movement as a very strong religious problem who enjoys a much more dangerous rhetoric 
now: “the caliphate and possible claim of a being prophet”. 
Yet, this religious rhetoric about being a prophet should be considered as part of the 
Ottoman government’s anti-propaganda against the Wahhabis. This is because the 
Wahhabis emerged with the claim to purify Islam and turn it to its original shape by taking 
bid’at out of it. Also, they considered other Muslims as the target of their jihad due to not 
practicing the true Islam in their perspective.
229
 Therefore, it can be said that since the 
Ottomans were also the target of their jihad, and their authority was challenged by them, 
the Ottoman government produced this claim to undermine the Wahhabi power and 
legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. 
After a short period of time of the invasion of Mecca on 30th of April 1803, Sharif 
Ghalib retook the city from the Wahhabis on 12th of July 1803, and the Wahhabis had to 
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In another part of the same document, it is stated that “Hazret-i İmam Hüseyin radiyallahu anh meşhed-i şeriflerini basup 
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ve hiraseti emrinde şerif hazretleri tarafından her ne kadar bezl-i vücud olunmakda ise dahi merkum Belde-i Tayyibenin 
turuk ve etrafını kat’ ve akvat celb iden urbanı men iderek…” 
229 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18.; Mehmet Ali 
Büyükkara, “Vehhabilik,” in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 42. (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2012), 
611. 
52 
 
return to al-Dir’iyya.230Yet, the Sublime Porte continued its effort to bring up solutions for 
the Wahhabi problem. For instance, it discussed the appointment of suitable people to the 
region, ordered its governors to cooperate each other against the Wahhabis as well as asked 
the Sharif to ensure the security of pilgrims by taking necessary precautions for 
it.
231
Moreover, it sent orders to tribal leaders and sheikhs. In those letters, Porte stated that 
since the Wahhabis created bid’at, it was their religious obligation to fight against them, so 
it warned the tribal leaders not to be part of Wahhabis’ sinful acts. In addition, the Sublime 
Porte used Qur’anic verses in those letters stating the exigency of obeying the ruler and his 
orders. By this means, it tried to convince them to leave the Wahhabi side.
232
 
Besides, the document dated on 17
th
 of October 1803 indicates the tension in the 
Ottoman Empire resulting from the Wahhabi insurgence and activities in Taif and Hijaz. In 
his letter, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar informs the central government about the spread of 
Wahhabi insurrection and their corruption. He states that since the Saudi leader increased 
his power by subordinating the tribes, and used them to incite anarchy, he unveiled his true 
intention. Even though, he seemed to leave Mecca, it was actually his deception. If the 
necessary preparations were not carried out and he invaded the holy lands again, it would 
be very hard to save and take the control of the region from him. Additionally, he puts 
forward that since his predecessor, Yusuf Pasha, did not make necessary preparations and 
no time left to make these preparations, he asks Sublime Porte to send urgent help to 
him
233
Therefore, even though the Wahhabis left Mecca, they may have become stronger 
developing into a serious threat against the Ottoman domination in the region by taking 
control of the tribes. 
Yet, although the Wahhabis were expelled from Mecca, they started to make 
provision to besiege Medina. By taking control of the port of Yenbu which is near to 
Medina, they blockaded the food circulation. Since the governors of Egypt, Damascus and 
Baghdad did not take necessary precautions to help Medina on time, this situation resulted 
in occurrence of famine in Medina. This is why the central government held a meeting to 
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evaluate the situation, and it decided to take control of Yenbu urgently. Besides, it held 
further meetings to discuss the appointment of suitable people to the governor positions to 
the region so as to solve the Wahhabi problem.
234
 While the central government was trying 
to come up with solutions, the Wahhabis invaded Medina in 1805. Yet, the Sublime Porte 
could not send any aid to Medina since it was occupied with other military campaigns at 
those times. After Medina, the Wahhabis reoccupied Mecca on January 1806, and it 
resulted in the submission of Sharif Ghalib to the Saudi leader.
235
   
Therefore, the invasion of Medina and second invasion of Mecca showed once 
again the gravity of the Wahhabi threat for not only the existence of the Ottoman Empire in 
the region, but also for the Islamic world. In the document dated on 9
th
 of September 1807, 
the chief qadi of Damascus informs the central government about the activities of the 
Wahhabis in his letter. He states that since the Saudi leader was in the claim of Caliphate 
and Sultanate, he invaded Medina and Mecca. He did not allow the entrance of governor of 
Damascus, Abdullah Pasha, to Medina with pilgrims by stating a Qur’anic verse 
prohibiting the entrance of polytheists to holy lands, so he distorted the verse by labeling 
pilgrims as polytheists(mushriks). Furthermore, he dismissed the qadis of Mecca and 
Medina, appointed his men to these duties, removed the name of the Ottoman sultan from 
Friday sermons as well as deflected pilgrims of Jeddah from the true path by subordinating 
them into his madhab and caliphate. Moreover, in order to subordinate people living in 
Rumelia and Anatolia into his madhab and caliphate, he gave some letters to pilgrims, and 
sent them to Damascus to deliver these letters Yet, when governor of Damascus, Yusuf 
Pasha, learned about the letters he took them from pilgrims and sent them to Istanbul. The 
reason why the Saudi leader did all of these was that he tried to prove himself as the 
servitor of the two holy sanctuaries in other words, the owner of caliphate. With this way, 
he did not allow people to enter Mecca for pilgrimage; if they did not follow his madhab 
and obey his caliphate. The Qadi of Damascus also states the solution for this problem. 
According to him, since it was stated many times to Istanbul, the solution for this problem 
was to send well equipped army from Baghdad, Egypt and Damascus. Otherwise, as long 
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as Haramayn was under the occupation of the Wahhabis, it would not be possible for 
pilgrims to go to Haramayn.
236
 
As a result, it can be seen that the Wahhabi uprising undermined not only the 
political legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire, but also its religious legitimacy. With the claim 
of sultanate, and removing the name of the sultan from Friday sermons, the Wahhabis 
openly challenged against the Ottoman domination in the region. With the invasion of 
Medina and Mecca and preventing the pilgrims to enter the holy lands, they weakened the 
religious legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultan, Selim III, as the servitor of holy lands within 
the Islamic world. This is because being the protector of Haramayn, and controlling 
pilgrimage routes were the sources of the Ottoman claim on the caliphate. Besides, since 
the qadi of Damascus suggested the creation of a common army with the cooperation of 
Baghdad, Egypt and Damascus, this suggestion once again proves how much it became 
hard for the Ottoman empire to overcome the Wahhabi threat.  
  After the invasion of Medina and Mecca, the central government held several 
meetings to discuss and to solve the pilgrimage problem. In those meetings, the central 
government also considered the hearings from its governors to produce solutions for it and 
stressed on hiding the pilgrimage problem from people. Also, it ordered the governors of 
Damascus, Baghdad and Egypt to cooperate with each other to solve the pilgrimage 
problem in 1807.
237
Yet, this cooperation could not take place since they had different 
reasons preventing them to take action together.
238
As a result, although the central 
government tried to find solution for pilgrimage problem, it could not decide how to act on 
this issue. In other words, it could not decide on whether to send pilgrims or delay the 
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pilgrimage, so it delayed its decision until it learned how the governor of Egypt would act 
for this situation.
239
As a result, the efforts of the central government could not ensure 
removal of the Wahhabis from region, and pilgrims could not carry out their pilgrimage 
between 1807 and 1809.
240
  
The reason why the central government considered Egypt very important in solving 
the Wahhabi problem was that Egypt was one of the richest provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire as well as being influential over Syria and Hijaz. Additionally, Jeddah’s import 
duties and Egypt were providing the budget for the expenses of Hijaz, and Hijaz and 
Jeddah were administratively connected to Egypt. By this means, the central government 
was controlling the Sharifs of Mecca. Due to this, the central government needed the 
cooperation of Egypt against the Wahhabis, and asked governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali 
Pasha, to go over them. However, although the central government asked him to go to 
Haramayn for the first time in 1805, he delayed this request until 1811. This is because he 
had internal problems within Egypt and was trying to establish his authority by eliminating 
Mamluk elites in the government. Additionally, he had to deal with England at those times, 
and he did not have enough military power to go against the Wahhabis.
241
 Therefore, in 
order to gain time and to provide answer for the suppression of central government, he 
promised the central government that when he solved his problems in Egypt, he would go 
to Haramayn. Therefore, when the Sublime Porte learnt that Muhammad Ali Pasha 
consolidated his power in Egypt in 1808, it expected him to keep his promise. In 1809, he 
informed the central government, and stated that since he solved his problems, he would go 
to Haramayn.
242
  
Yet, the document dated on 30th of January 1809 indicates that while waiting for 
the response of Muhammad Ali Pasha to agree on carrying out a military expedition against 
the Wahhabis, the central government continued its efforts to solve the Wahhabi problem. 
The document shows the peace agreement concluded between the Wahhabis and the 
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Ottoman Empire, and the correspondences between them. To explain, in the document, the 
Guardian of Mecca, Hasan Pasha, informs Muhammad Ali Pasha about the situation in 
Mecca. He states that although a peace agreement was made with the Wahhabis for now, 
Abd Allah ibn Saud,
243
 exploited the agreement and abused it as an opportunity for further 
instigations. He subordinated the tribes in Bişe, Asir and Şiran within the Hijaz, the main 
tribe in Taif and all the tribes in Yemen. He forcibly collected taxes from them, openly 
declared himself as their possessor, and by this means, he enhanced his strength. This is 
why Hasan Pasha underlines the urgent need for soldiers to protect the tribes from the 
Wahhabis. Also, he warns about the situation that the tribes were far from being used for 
necessary services. Even, they were taking sides with the Wahhabis because the Wahhabis 
gave them a sum from the zakat he collected. Therefore, Hasan Pasha states that there were 
clear evidences about the infection of Wahhabi corruption to tribes in these places, and he 
even sent a letter to the Saudi leader to protest this situation. He also told him that he 
removed the qadis appointed by him. As a response, the Saudi leader rejected the 
allegations and stated that the subordinations of the Bişe and Asir were realized even before 
the peace agreement.  In return, Hasan Pasha advised him to stay away from Bişe and Asir. 
Then, Hasan Pasha states that he received another response which was sent to Istanbul, and 
he informed Muhammad Ali Pasha about the disloyalty of the tribes in the region. 
244
    
Therefore, although the Ottoman empire considered the Wahhabis as existential 
threat for its presence since 1803, it continued its negotiation policy by making a peace 
agreement with them. By this means, it might have aimed to stop their expansion, to restore 
its authority in the region and probably secure the pilgrim routes as well by binding them to 
a peace agreement. The reason why the Ottoman Empire could not confront with them until 
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Muhammad Ali Pasha accepted Haramayn mission might be that although the central 
government ordered its local governors to cooperate with each other against the Wahhabis, 
they could not carry out this order. The Ottoman Empire tried to solve the Wahhabi 
problem through his local governors because during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, the 
Ottoman Empire experienced the decentralization process which transformed its 
governmental and economic system.
245
 As a result of this situation, the local elites in the 
Ottoman provinces increased their power vis a vis the central government.
246
 The Ottoman 
Empire became depended on the military and economic aids of its local governors when it 
fought with its enemies since it did not have enough economic and military resources to 
carry out its wars.
247
 Therefore, the central government had to seek their help to be able to 
conduct a military campaign to eliminate the Wahhabi threat.  
Besides, during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807), particular events occurred in 
international and domestic politics. After the failure of the Ottoman army against Russia 
during the war between 1787-1792, Selim III needed to carry out Nizam-ı Cedit reforms in 
1792. These reforms brought about financial burden to the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, 
he needed to strengthen the central authority against the local elites, and had to deal with 
the revolts of some of the local powers in 1790s. Furthermore, he faced with the threat of 
the national uprising of the Serbians in 1804, and in 1805, he tried to bring compulsory 
military service in Anatolia and Rumelia. Yet, it caused serious reactions of the local elites 
and military confrontation of Nizam-ı Cedit army with them, which weakened the Selim’s 
authority profoundly. Apart from domestic politics, Selim III experienced dangerous times 
in international politics as well.  In 1798, France invaded Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire 
could end this invasion in 1803. Afterwards Selim III felt obliged to recognize Napoleon as 
the Emperor of France like Prussia due to his military victories against his opponents in 
Europe. Yet, this situation cost a war with Russia and England in 1806. When it comes to 
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1807, Selim III was overthrown by a coup d’etat,248 and Mahmud II succeeded him in 
1808. Yet, political problems continued when Mahmud II came to power as well.  The war 
with England and Russia lasted until 1809 and 1812.
249
 As a result, it can be seen that the 
Ottoman Empire went through a turbulent and painful period due to the political upheavals 
in foreign and internal politics during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II These political 
and economic problems as well as dependence on the military and economic aids of local 
elites forestalled the Ottoman Empire to deal with the Wahhabi insurgency efficiently. 
Therefore, the Ottoman Empire carried out a negotiation policy towards the Wahhabis 
instead of confronting them.  
However, when it comes to 1810, the Ottoman policy shifted from negotiation to 
confrontation towards the Wahhabis since the Wahhabis did not comply with the conditions 
of the agreement, and violated it by subordinating the tribes. Besides, the central 
government found out that Muhammad Ali Pasha was ready to carry out a military 
campaign against the Wahhabis since he solved his problems in Egypt. Therefore, Mahmud 
II sent his order Muhammad Ali Pasha in 1810 to advance towards Wahhabis, and he 
started to make necessary preparation for his military campaign to Hijaz. On 1
st
 of March 
1811, he appointed his son, Tosun Pasha as the head of the army and Tosun pasha started 
his expedition in September 1811.
250
 His army first took the control of Yenbu. Then, he 
conquered Medina with the assistance of Sharif Ghalib, and the name of the Ottoman sultan 
was again mentioned in the mosque in Medina on 16
th
 of November, 1812
251
 
Yet, in spite of the success of Tosun Pasha in Medina, the Sharif was still worried 
about the Wahhabi threat. The document dated on 3
rd
 of January 1813 shows that the Sharif 
of Mecca shares his serious concerns about the Wahhabi threat with Muhammad Ali Pasha 
and wants to exchange views on the Wahhabi problem. According to the Sharif, even 
though the Ottoman army would prevail over the Wahhabis in the battle, the Wahhabis 
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would continue to create unrest and kill people like they did before. In order to protect the 
whole region and Haramayn from the disturbance of the Wahhabis, to ensure a safe passage 
for pilgrims and the protection of the tribes, he suggested Muhammad Ali Pasha to assign 
the sürre of the tribes to the Wahhabis this time to make peace with them and stop their 
sedition. Therefore, he asks Muhammad Ali Pasha’s opinion about coming to an agreement 
with the Wahhabis and told him that if his suggestion was approved by the Sublime Porte, 
he would start working on it. Otherwise, he asked Muhammad Ali Pasha to keep it as a 
secret since he was also keeping this idea as a secret.
252
   
Yet, another document dated on the 3
rd
 of January 1813 demonstrates how 
Muhammad Ali Pasha responds to Sharif’s offer through his son, Tosun Ahmed Pasha. In 
his response, he harshly criticizes and opposes the idea to conclude peace with the 
Wahhabis. He maintains that according to the Ottoman Law, sürre would be assigned to the 
tribes who bent to the Ottoman sultan, and giving sürre to the Wahhabis, a branch of 
Kharijites, would be unfair to the tribes who were already bent to the Ottoman sultan. 
Therefore, the Ottoman sultan did not give his consent for the idea of giving sürre to them. 
Moreover, he underlines that he did not want to be criticized and remembered in historical 
records as a person who gave sürre to the Wahhabis. This is because he thinks that peace 
would be made between two states, and concluding peace with a branch of Kharijites would 
be very shameful for himself. Therefore, he orders his son not to conclude peace with the 
Wahhabis, and even not to give quarter (aman) to them.
253
 
Therefore, it seems that there was a disagreement between the Muhammad Ali 
Pasha and the Sharif of Mecca about handling the Wahhabi threat. Since Muhammad Ali 
Pasha considered the Wahhabis very dangerous, he wanted to continue confronting them to 
remove this threat from the region. On the other hand, although the Sharif considered them 
in the same way, he instead offered to make negotiations through a peace agreement instead 
of confronting them. Even though they thought differently, either plan of theirs shows how 
much the Wahhabis became perilous and serious threat for the existence and domination of 
the Ottoman Empire in the region. Furthermore, this situation proves the importance of 
supervising the tribes to take the control of the region from the Wahhabis, and to restore the 
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central authority. Besides, the statement of Muhammad Ali Pasha indicates how much he 
was confident in himself, and he considered this mission as a matter of prestige for himself.  
Since Tosun Pasha did not make a peace agreement with the Wahhabis, he went to 
the expedition on Jeddah, Mecca on 22
nd
 of January 1813 and Taif, and cleaned these 
regions from the Wahhabis like he did in Medina. By this means, the Wahhabis were 
removed from Haramayn, and Mahmud II received the title of Ghazi after this achievement. 
Besides, Mahmud II sent gifts Muhammad Ali pasha and his son, Tosun Pasha, for their 
success. This success helped Muhammad Ali Pasha wax his prestige in the eyes of central 
government as well as promoting his power in Egypt.
254
  
The Sublime Porte was very delighted with the removal of the Wahhabis from 
Haramayn since this achievement ameliorated Ottoman domination in the region, and 
prestige of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph.255 Furthermore, it enabled the Ottomans to 
carry out pilgrimage service again. Yet, after Haramayn defeat, the Wahhabis retreated to 
al- Dir’iyya, and they were still posing serious threat to the pilgrims, so there were some 
hesitations about the safety of pilgrimage. Even though possible threat of the Wahhabis and 
apprehensions about their threat, pilgrims could make a pilgrimage in 1813 with the 
implemented precautions, and in 1814, pilgrimage service could be provided as usual in the 
past.
256
  
Yet, after taking control of Haramayn, Tosun Pasha continued to fight with the 
Wahhabis, and the Wahhabis wanted to make a peace agreement with him to end the war. 
In the document dated on 4th of August 1815, Muhammad Ali Pasha explains the situation 
in Haramayn to the Ottoman sultan, and why Tosun Pasha accepted the Wahhabis’ plea for 
mercy and their conditions to end the war. He states that Tosun Pasha prevailed over the 
son of Saud, Abd Allah ibn Saud, in the battle near Medina. Therefore, the sons of the Saud 
fell in despair in every aspect, and they did not have a choice, but beg for forgiveness. Yet, 
they also laid down some conditions to end the war. Muhammad Ali Pasha states that the 
reason why Tosun Pasha accepted their plea for mercy was that his armies were not near al-
                                                          
254 Güner, Osmanlı Arabistanı’nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbi-Suûdiler (1744-1819), 185,186. 
255 Madawi Al Rasheed, Politics In An Arabian Oasis (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 37.; Betül Ayaz, “Hilafet ve Siyaset: 
Osmanlı Devleti’nin Hac Hizmetleri (1798-1876)” (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2014), 131. 
256 Ibid., 133,134, 143. 
61 
 
Dir’iyya and they were facing with the problem of food shortage within the armies. Tosun 
Pasha consulted Ahmed Ağa, the treasurer of Muhammad Ali Pasha, and they found 
sustaining the war inconvenient within these conditions. This is why they ended the war 
with the Wahhabis and returned Medina. By this means, Tosun Pasha aimed to complete 
the food supply for his armies. Therefore, Muhammad Ali Pasha states that the issue of al-
Dir’iyya became easier and whenever the Wahhabis caused a problem, he would handle the 
problem and eradicate them.
257
 
Yet, the document on 27
th
 of August 1815 shows that this peace agreement did not 
turn out to be beneficial for the Ottoman Empire. On 27 August 1815, The Sharif informs 
Muhammad Ali Pasha about the result of peace agreement with the Wahhabis. He states 
that this peace agreement was concluded while the son of Saud, Abd Allah ibn Saud, had 
lack of money and were trying to solve this problem. Thus, he sent letters and his men to 
Asir, Bişe, Türbe and Hijaz, and declared openly to all the tribes that they belonged to him. 
He took their zakat, and gave more than the quarter of money to the tribe sheiks. By this 
means, some of them secretly and some of them openly started acts of sedition. This is why 
the Meccan Sharif asks Muhammad Ali Pasha to open a new campaign to bring order by 
convincing some of tribes kindly and some of them forcibly to stop their disturbances.
258
 
This situation was confirmed by Mehmed Necib, the representative (kapu 
kethüdası) of Muhammad Ali Pasha at the Sublime Porte, on December 2, 1815. Mehmed 
Necib states that letters were sent from the guardian of Mecca, Muhafız Hasan Pasha and 
from the Sharif of Mecca to Muhammad Ali Pasha about continuing disturbance of the 
                                                          
257 BOA, HH. 341 19533, 1230. Ş 27. (4th of August 1815), The document does not indicate the terms for reconciliation 
demanded by the Wahhabis. -… Suûdun oğulları merkumun her cihetle mukavemetden me’yûs ile devlet-ı aliyye-i ibdel 
kıyâma tav’ ve …. ve teslimden gayrı çare bulamadıklarından dâmen-i affu ve iğtizara teşebbüs ve af ve itlâkları 
hususunda her müşârünileyh vâsıta ittihaz idüb  bâ’zı şürût  ve iman ile iki nefer mu’teber ve mu’temed rehinler irsâl ve 
her bir iki rehin mısırda nezdi bendegîde birer sene ikamet ve sene tekmilinde bir seneye her aharı vürûd eyledikte 
seleflerine ruhsat verilmek husûslarını te’kîd ve îzah iderek iltimas etmiş oldukları ve müşârünileyhin olduğu kabim nâm 
mahal Deriyye’ye  ba’id mesafe olub ordularında zehâire dahi kıllet-i tari olduğundan zahîre tedârikiyle meşgul olunsa 
vakit ve fırsat kuvvet olacağı müsadesini müşârünileyh taakkul ve teferrüş eylediğinden… 
258 BOA, HH. 344 19648 C, 1230. N 21. (27th of August 1815), …bu defa Vehhabi ile niyet olunan müsâlaha maddesi 
Suûdun oğlu Abdullahı müzâyakadan halâs ve tabiat-ı hâriciyelerinde mevdû’ olan fesad ve hıyâneti icrâda fırsat arar 
iken bu musâlaha zuhûr ve etraf Asir ve Bişe? ve Türbe? ve Hicaza bir tarafdan mektuplar ve bir tarafdan mübâşirleri 
tesrib ve cümle urban benimsünüz deyu ızhar-ı kelâm ve urban şeyhlerine urbana zekâtının rub’undan ziyâdesini 
meşâyihe î’tâ ve bu vesile ile kimi mahfî ve kimi zâhir fesada şuruu derkâr olmağla bu maddeleri mücerred sultanım 
teşrifiyle kimini kahren ve kimini iltifatı inâyet ile çend gün zarfında nizam ve illa siz olmadıkça bir madde vech-i lâyık 
üzere icrâ olunmaz ve eğer siz sultanımız bu sene-i mübârekede teşrîfiniz mevkuf olur ise umûr-ı kahrı düşmana tasdi 
eder… 
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Wahhabis in the region. He states that the peace agreement did not prevent the Wahhabi 
leader, Abd Allah ibn Saud, from continuing his seditious activity. He never quit his 
instigation and continued to subordinate the tribes by forcing and tricking them. It was 
obvious from his actions that he urged the tribes to revolt in Hijaz as before, and exploited 
the peace agreement to wax his strength This is why Mehmet Necip informs Istanbul that a 
few the troops sent by Muhammad Ali Pasha were not enough to control Hijaz. To 
completely purify Hijaz and to eradicate the Wahhabis from there, a mass number of well-
equipped soldiers were needed.
259
  
Therefore, this situation shows that although Muhammad Ali Pasha declined the 
peace offer of the Sharif by criticizing him before, he had to change his view since the army 
under the command of his son could not prevail over them completely due to logistical 
issues. Additionally, this situation indicates that although the Wahhabis were thrown out 
from Haramayn, it did not profoundly affect their power, and they continued to pose a 
serious threat to the Ottoman Empire by subordinating the tribes in the region. Furthermore, 
it once again proves how much the role of tribes was significant to control the region, and 
the tribes reflect the fragmented structure of power dynamics in this area. Therefore, to 
restore its authority in the region, the Ottoman Empire also aimed to control the tribes like 
the Wahhabis did. 
Moreover, the document dated on 22th of March 1816 shows the continuing threat 
of the Wahhabis to Haramayn, and the complaints of the Sharif of Mecca about 
Muhammad Ali Pasha. In the document, the Sharif explains to Istanbul about his situation 
and the situation in Hijaz. He states that Muhammad Ali Pasha rescued Hijaz from the 
Wahhabis, and cleaned them from the region, and afterwards he returned Egypt by taking 
his son Tosun Pasha with himself last year. He only left 800.000 soldiers in Mecca and he 
did not pay attention to carry out the necessary measures. That explains why the tribes 
which were both kindly and forcibly subordinated came together with the Wahhabis as it 
was before. Therefore, he warned Istanbul about that if the necessary supplies were not 
provided immediately, it was certain that the Wahhabis would invade Haramayn like in the 
past. Besides, another topic the Sharif complains about is the control of his income by of 
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Muhammad Ali Pasha. The Sharif states that Muhammad Ali Pasha was controlling all his 
income and did not allow him to be involved in any matters. Due to this, he did not receive 
enough money, his influence was decreasing and eventually would vanish, and he was not 
able to draw the tribes on his side, anymore. Moreover, he mentions some of the people’s 
name, and states that these people started to interfere his duties, and made alliances with the 
tribes which plundered Taif since Muhammad Ali Pasha left limited number of soldiers in 
the region. This would clarify on why he complains about his concern that he has nothing 
but the title of the Sharif, and states that this situation also led to a decrease in his influence. 
As a result, the Sharif asks Istanbul to receive the income belonged to Mecca as it was, and 
warns Istanbul to handle this situation before the pilgrim season by taking necessary 
precautions. Otherwise, it would be too late. 
260
   
Therefore, this document reflects the disagreement and rivalry between two regional 
powers, the Sharif and Muhammad Ali Pasha, as well as reflecting the efforts of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha to control the Sharif. Besides, it indicates how easy for tribes to 
change their allegiances in accordance with their economic interests. It also shows that in 
order to protect Haramayn from the Wahhabis, the Ottoman Empire needed the influence of 
the Sharif as well as needed to provide him necessary amount of money to keep the tribes 
under his control.  
Similarly, Tosun Pasha thought that removal of the Wahhabis from Haramayn was 
not sufficient to eliminate the Wahhabi threat. According to him, in order to eradicate the 
Wahhabis from the region completely, he needed to carry out further military campaign 
towards al-Dir’iyya, the heartland of the Wahhabis, and he informed his father, Muhammad 
Ali Pasha, about his ideas.
261
 As a result, after pilgrims returned, the central government 
decided for the military campaign for al-Dir’iyya in Najd. Yet, for this military campaign, 
Muhammad Ali Pasha appointed his other son, Ibrahım Pasha in 1816. In 1817, Ibrahim 
                                                          
260 BOA, HH. 345 19690 D, 1231. R 22. (22nd of March 1816), …Haremeyn-i Muhteremeynin levfi vücûd muhâlifinden 
tathîr ve tanzîfîyle hidemât-ı meşkûre ve mesai-i makbuleye muvaffak olmuş ise de  geçen sene badel hac mahdumı Tosun 
paşayı  bil istishab Mısır’a avdet ve muhâfız nâmıyla Mekke-i Mükerremede [sekiz yüz-bin] neferden ibaret asker 
tevkifiyle istihkâmât-ı lâzıme ve tedâbiri münkazîyeyi icrâya î’tîna ve dikkat itmemiş olduğundan tav’an ve kahren gerden 
bendi itâat olan kabaîli mütefferika kemâkân cânibi hâricî ile  zünnar bendi vifâk olarak mutarassıt vakit fırsat 
olduklarından şimdiden tedârikât-ı lâzımeye mübâşeret olunmaz ise mazallahu teâlâ yine eski halde netîce vereceği  
derkâr olub… 
261 Güner, Osmanlı Arabistanı’nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbi-Suûdiler (1744-1819), 187. 
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pasha went over the Wahhabis with a mass number of soldiers, and prevailed over them. He 
also killed some of their commanders, and took all their goods. Thus, he conquered Najd, 
and he was very close to al-Dir’iyya. This is why the Saud sent his man to Ibrahim Pasha, 
and told him that if the Pasha did not touch al-Dir’iyya, he would give whatever he wants. 
Ibrahim Pasha declined his offer.
262
 In 1818, Ibrahim Pasha besieged the town, took its 
control within the same year and sent the Wahhabi leader, Abd Allah ibn Saud, to Istanbul 
where he was executed. By this means, almost seventy years later of its spread, the 
Ottoman Empire eliminated the Wahhabi threat by ending the first Saudi-Wahhabi 
dynasty.
263
  
Yet, the document dated on September/October 1818 shows that although the 
Ottomans captured the heartland of the Wahhabis, al-Dir’iyya, they still feared the strength 
of the Wahhabis. This document was written by the governor of Sidon, Ibrahim Pasha, to 
Muhammad Ali Pasha to explain why he needed to stay for three or four more months in al-
Dir’iyya although he was ordered by Istanbul to return Medina after the conquest of al-
Dir’iyya. Ibrahim Pasha states that ninety-two years passed over the emergence of the 
Wahhabis, and their leaders were called as Amirs among the Arabs. In addition, these 
leaders used to create unrest, and even their subjects learned the art of war entirely due to 
the wars occurring in last couple of years. This would explain why he puts forward that 
since their community was wretched and advancement of their governments was ended 
after his military campaign, the seeds of their sedition must be completely eliminated as 
required. Otherwise, they would not be destroyed completely, and they would emerge again 
after his return. Within that situation, even though a mass number of soldiers were sent over 
them, it was obvious that it would be impossible to bring them under control again. 
Therefore, Ibrahim Pasha states that to provide solid order of the region, he would stay for 
three or four more months, and it was his duty to inform Istanbul about the situation in the 
region. He also states that he was expecting from Muhammad Ali Pasha to inform him 
immediately about how they should act on and take precautions for this matter.
264
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263 Madawi Al Rasheed, Politics In An Arabian Oasis (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 37. 
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Therefore, this situation proves once again the gravity of the Wahhabi threat in the 
region, and continuing threat of the Wahhabis even though their heartland, Al-Dir’iyya, 
was destroyed by the Ottomans. Furthermore, it shows how deep-rooted their influence was 
in the region. Last but not least, this document also demonstrates and proves that the Arab 
perception of the Ottoman Empire dramatically changed because the Arabs did not know 
how to fight before as stated in the document above. Yet, with the emergence of the 
Wahhabis, this situation changed and they learnt the art of war, which explains why the 
Ottoman Empire worried about a possible threat of the Wahhabis for the following days. 
This is why it can be said that the Wahhabis did not only change the Arab perception of the 
Ottoman Empire, but also profoundly transformed the structure of the society in the region.   
 
3.2. Religious Reaction of the Ottoman Empire Against the Wahhabi Movement: 
 
Another important point to emphasize is how the Ottoman State perceived the 
Wahhabis from the religious aspect. Şeker indicates that the Ottoman authorities used the 
same weapon which was used by Wahhabis towards other Muslims. To explain, the 
Ottomans defined the Wahhabis as superstitious and blamed them for creating new bid‘at 
because they claimed to remove bid‘at from Islam. Therefore, the Ottomans categorized 
them as superstitious because of their beliefs like the Wahhabis considered the Ottomans. 
265
 Furthermore, the document dated on 28
th
 of April 1803 also indicates that the Ottomans 
used the word ‘mülhid’(unbeliever) to define the Wahhabis266 like the Wahhabis labelled 
the Ottoman pilgrims as ‘müşrik’ (polytheist).267 Besides, the Ottoman government used the 
term of “Kharijites” to define Wahhabis since it saw itself as the main representative of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
münâsebetiyle fenn-i harbi kemaliyle öğrenmiş olmalarıyla kuvvet-i tâli-i padişahî ile cemiyetleri bu kadarca perîşân ve 
hükümetleri resîde-i pâyân olmuş iken etraf ve eknaftan uruk-ı mefsedetleri gereği gibi kat’ olunmaz ise gaileleri bütün 
bütün bertaraf olamayub bendelerinin avdetimden sonra ümerâsından nice nice gümrahın taraf-be-taraf zuhuruyla bu 
havâlileri mal-a-mal şerr ü şûr idecekleri ve tekrar bir bu kadar mal ve asker telef ile üzerlerine gelinsede nizâm-ı halleri 
mümkün olamayacağı bedîhî olmaktan nâşî bu çöl ve beyâbânda meşakkat-i sefer ile meslubu’r-raha olduğum her ne 
kadar… 
265 Şeker, Osmanlılar ve Vehhâbilik, 58. 
266 BOA, HH 93 3796, 1218. M 06. (28th of April 1803) 
267 BOA, HH. 94 3839 B, 1222. B 06. (9th of September 1807) 
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Islam, so the attack of the Wahhabis meant for the Ottomans as a direct attack on Islam, 
since they regarded their Islamic practices as proper Islam.
268
 
Like Şeker, Commins and Güner also agree that by 1802, the Ottomans had been 
mounting a doctrinal campaign, sending official tracts refuting Wahhabi positions and 
likening them to the Kharijites of early Islamic times.”269 This is because the Wahhabis 
rejected all Sunni madhabs by ascribing them unbelief (takfir).
270
In addition to this term, 
Güner indicates that additional terms like İbâdi271, Rafizî272, Hârici-i Suûd, Hâricî-i 
menhus, Hâricî-i Abdülvehhab were used in the Ottoman official correspondences to name 
the Wahhabis.
273
 As noted in previous parts of the thesis, both Wahhabis and the Kharijites 
shared similar understanding of the Qur’an. Yet, Güner puts forward that although there 
were parallelisms among them, this does not mean that Wahhabis were the continuation of 
the Kharijites. But, according to her, although religion was in the center of all these 
criticizing discourses and fights, the Ottomans saw the Wahhabi threat primarily as a 
security problem. The threat they posed towards the Ottoman authorities in the region 
influenced the discourse of the Ottoman State towards them.
274
 However, although the 
Wahhabi threat shaped the discourse of the Ottomans, it does not mean that political 
implications of the Wahhabi movement were more important than its religious implications 
for the Ottoman Empire. That is to say, even though the primary concern of the Sublime 
Porte was to provide security and order in Haramayn, it gave equal weight to understand 
their creeds, and to negate their religious doctrine. The decision of sending alim, Adem 
Efendi, as its emissary to the Wahhabis to understand their creeds,
275
 and to convince them 
about the principal contradiction of Wahhabism to Sunni Islam
276
 proves that Ottomans did 
not merely consider the Wahhabi movement as a political problem, but also a religious 
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270 Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), 104. 
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problem. Also, its seems that the efforts of the Sublime Porte to convince the Wahhabis to 
change their views continued until 1813.  
The document dated on 3th of January 1813 shows that the Saudi leader not only 
sent some epistles and statements of Ulama beside his letters to the governor of Damascus, 
Suleiman Pasha, but also declared the true believers (Ahl al-tawhid) as unbelievers. These 
documents were translated and sent to Istanbul with their original copy. In the document, it 
is stated that although response letters were written in conformity with Sharia and logic to 
convince him, these letters were far from convincing him because he maintained his 
stubbornness. This is why, it is stated that there was no need to send response from 
Istanbul; the response of Suleiman Pasha was enough. This was notified by Istanbul and the 
center found it appropriate for Suleiman Pasha to send a response letter. 
277
Therefore, this 
situation also proves that the Ottomans considered the Wahhabis not only a political 
problem but also a serious religious problem, as well. 
Apart from the official documentation, we know that the Ottoman chronicles also 
discussed Wahhabism in their accounts. Güner states that in the Ottoman historiography, 
the first Ottoman chronicle talking about the Wahhabis was the chronicle of İzzi Süleyman 
Efendi in 1752. According to her, almost all the Ottoman chronicles shared similar ideas 
about the Wahhabis. To illustrate, they saw the Wahhabi problem both as a religious and a 
security problem. Yet, they considered this security problem like other security problems 
which occurred in the other parts of the Empire.
278
 Also, the author states that chroniclers 
like İzzi Süleyman Efendi, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, Eyüp Sabri Pasha mostly reflected the 
official discourse of the government which evaluated the Wahhabism as a superstitious 
belief.
279
  
However, the late Ottoman author Hüseyin Kazım appears to be noteworthy since 
he indicated a separate attitude from the official discourse. Both Güner and Şeker show that 
                                                          
277 BOA, HH. 343 19599, 1229 Z 29. (3rd of January 1813), The document does not indicate the name of the Saudi leader. 
Yet, it coincided with the reign Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz(1803-1814), …merkum Suud’un mukaddimeleri dahi iş bu defa olan 
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278 Güner, Osmanlı Arabistanı’nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbi-Suûdiler (1744-1819), 227-229. 
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unlike the abovementioned authors, he did not reprove the movement because he saw its 
discourse within the boundaries of ahl al-sunnah.
280
 In fact, he supported their aim about 
removing the bid‘a and turning back to the original Islam.281  
Yet, Şeker points to the fact that Cevdet Pasha’s account is crucial in terms of 
analyzing the Wahhabis because those works compiled after Cevdet Pasha did little but 
repeating the stance and rhetoric of his account. According to Cevdet Pasha, the reasons of 
the spread of Wahhabism were based on blood relations (asabiyyah), and geographical 
condition of the region, Najd which was a closed region to outside world, and always 
witnessed the different belief systems throughout history. Also, he states other reasons 
which explain the spread of the Wahhabi movement. According to him, the Ottomans did 
not interfere with the movement on time since they did not evaluate the Wahhabis as a 
political threat, and likened them to Kadızadelis. Therefore, he asserts that, if the Ottomans 
intervened them in the beginning, they could have prevented Wahhabism to become a 
political threat to the Ottoman Empire in the first place.  Şeker provides names such as 
Eyüp Sabri Pasha, Midhat Pasha and Ahmet Midhat Efendi as Cevdet Pasha’s 
contemporary colleagues who shared similar ideas with him. As the followers of Cevdet 
Pasha, he states names like Abdurrahman Şeref, Haydari-zade, Hüseyin Hüsni, Şehbender-
zade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, Yusuf Akçura, İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Said Nursi, Ömer Rıza and 
Zakir Kadiri.
282
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Ottoman conquest of the Arab lands started with the reign of Selim I in the 16th 
century, and continued during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.  With the conquests 
of these lands, the Ottoman sultans acquired the title of ‘servitor of Mecca and Medina’, 
and started to control the pilgrim routes. Also, these conquests enabled the Ottoman Empire 
to become the sole representative and protector of Sunni Islam. By this means, the Ottoman 
sultans provided a legitimate base for their claim on caliphate. 
Yet, the Wahhabi Movement challenged the Ottoman domination in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and undermined its legitimacy and prestige by invading Mecca and Medina with 
the claim of sultanate and caliphate, and blockading the pilgrimage routes in the beginning 
of the 19th century. The political upheavals, military defeats and economic drawbacks 
within Ottoman lands created internal weakness which enabled the expansion of the 
Wahhabi movement in the region, and these factors shaped the Ottoman policy and the 
perception towards the Wahhabis. 
To recapitulate, from 1749 onwards, when the Sublime Porte for the first time 
received the intelligence about Abd al-Wahhab’s activities until the Wahhabi invasion of 
Al-Ahsa in 1795, the Ottoman center seems to have been unable to comprehend the gravity 
of the Wahhabi threat, which prevented them to take effective precautions to hinder its 
spread in the beginning. Due to this failure in evaluation, the Wahhabi movement added to 
a growing power vacuum in the region and managed to fill it easily, and once they 
expanded, it became more difficult for the Ottomans to tackle with the movement. The 
invasion of Al-Ahsa in 1795 and the result of the first direct confrontation of the Ottomans 
with the Wahhabis in 1798 to retake this region are among the proofs for this situation. 
They showed the center that the Wahhabis were not an easy target to remove from the 
region anymore. This is why the invasion of Al-Ahsa can be defined as the first turning 
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point which changed the perception of the Ottoman State about the Wahhabis. The Empire 
started to consider them a serious political and regional problem rather than a minor local 
dispute, and this situation pushed it to take more concrete steps. Therefore, until the 
governor of Baghdad, Suleiman Pasha complied with the order of the Sublime Porte to 
attack and to force the Wahhabis to conclude peace, the central government played the 
mediator role to palliate the animosity between the Sharif and the Saudi leader. By this 
means, it aimed to solve the Wahhabi problem and halt their expansion. Yet, the center 
could not achieve to solve the disagreement between them. Also, Suleiman Pasha could not 
overcome the Wahhabis during the military operations, which created obstacle for his peace 
efforts. He had to make truce with them for six years at the end of these military operations, 
and it showed the Ottomans the extent of the incremental increase in Wahhabis’ power over 
time. Besides, even though the Ottomans carried out military campaigns against the 
Wahhabis after realizing the severity of their threat, the political and economic conditions 
of the Ottoman Empire because of its involvement in the Napoleonic wars, and its internal 
problems seemed to have blocked their capability to prevent the Wahhabi threat in an 
efficient manner.  
Following the loss of Al-Ahsa, it seems that the second turning for the Ottoman 
Empire was the Karbala incident in 1802. It created a political crisis with Iran, and it also 
proved the Ottomans once again how powerful the Wahhabis became by daring to attack 
and plunder a holy place for both the Shiites and the Sunnis. Thus, it became a much more 
serious political issue turning to an international problem for the Ottoman Empire. 
Additionally, after the Karbala incident, the Sublime Porte continued its negotiation policy 
towards the Wahhabis. Yet, it left its mediator role as a third party, and became the side of 
the negotiations since it sent an alim, Adem Efendi, to negotiate with the Wahhabis directly 
on its behalf. By this means, the center aimed to convince them to alter their religious 
discourse and to pacify the movement by learning their religious rhetoric. Therefore, the 
decision of appointing an alim shows that the Wahhabi movement was not only a serious 
political problem, but also a religious problem for the Ottoman Empire. The central 
government wanted to generate solutions within the religious basis as well. 
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The invasion of Mecca and Medina became the last, but most powerful turning 
point in regard to the Ottoman perception about the Wahhabis. The Wahhabi invasion of 
the Two Holy Cities which were providing a religious legitimacy for the claim of the 
Ottoman sultans as the protector of the Islamic world, forced the Ottomans to change their 
perception about the Wahhabis one more time. Since the Wahhabis invaded these holy 
cities with the claim of Sultanate and Caliphate, and prevented pilgrims to enter Haramayn, 
they challenged the Ottoman domination. By this means, they became an existential threat 
for its presence in the region. Yet, until the governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha, 
accepted to open a military campaign to regain the Haramayn from the Wahhabis, the 
Ottoman Empire continued its negotiation policy until 1809 even by making a peace 
agreement with them. This is because it was busy with other political problems at those 
times, including the Napoleonic Wars, and these problems occluded it to send military aid 
to Haramayn. Yet, this situation changed after Muhammad Ali Pasha complying with the 
order of Mahmud II order and the Wahhabis violating the conditions of the agreement by 
subordinating the tribes under their rule. As a result, the Ottoman Empire shifted its policy 
from negotiation to confrontation in 1810, and resorted to military solution to eradicate the 
Wahhabi presence from the region, and achieved this aim in 1818 temporarily. 
Last but most important, the Wahhabi movement made another significant change 
in the perception of the Ottoman Empire about the Arabs. Even though the Ottomans 
removed the Wahhabis from Haramayn, and conquered their capital al-Dir’iyya, they 
continued to be cautious about their possible threat. This is because they realized that with 
the Wahhabi movement, the Arabs learned the art of war. Therefore, the Ottomans planned 
to take precautions to prevent their revival in the future. 
Therefore, it can be said that the Ottoman perception about the Wahhabi movement 
changed over time. From the beginning of the Wahhabi threat in 1745 to the invasion of Al-
Ahsa in 1795, the Ottoman policy towards the Wahhabis remained passive since it did not 
consider them a serious political issue. Yet, with the loss of Al-Ahsa in 1795, the 
movement became a regional problem as well as a serious political problem for the 
Ottomans. In 1802, with the Karbala incident, it became an international problem. 
Furthermore, with the invasion of Mecca in 1803 and Medina in 1805, it became an 
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existential threat for the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic power. Since its negotiation policy 
did not work to solve the Wahhabi problem, the Sublime Porte could not find another way 
but conduct an offensive policy towards them by ordering the mobilization of a major army 
in 1810, i.e. the Egyptian army, against the Wahhabis. Thus, it transformed its policy from 
negotiation to confrontation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Primary Sources:  
Cevdet Paşa, Ahmet. Tarih- i Cevdet (Cevdet’s History), 2nd ed., Vol.7. Dersaadet, 
Istanbul: Matbaa- yı Osmaniye, 1893.   
Sabri Paşa, Eyüp. Tarih- i Vehhâbiyan (History of Wahhabis). Istanbul: Kırk Anbar 
Matbaası, 1877. 
Süleyman Efendi, İzzi. Tarih- i İzzi (İzzi’s History). Istanbul: n.p., 1199. 
The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister's Office (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, 
İstanbul, BOA): 
BOA, HH. 179 8091, 1211.Za. (24th of May 1797) 
BOA, HH. 221 12324, 1212.L 11. (29th of March 1798) 
BOA, HH. 228 12752, 1212.Z 29. (14th of June 1798) 
BOA, HH. 123 5086, 1217.B 22. (18th of November 1802)   
BOA, HH. 93 3793 B, 1217. Z 29. (22nd of April 1803) 
BOA, HH 93 3796, 1218. M 06. (28th of April 1803) 
BOA, HH. 92 3784 L, 1218. Ra 25. (15th of July 1803) 
BOA, HH 94 3812, 1218 S 26 (17th of June 1803) 
BOA, HH 92 3785 A, 1218. B 01. (17th of October 1803) 
BOA, HH. 94 3823, 1218. Z 29. (10th of April 1804) 
BOA, HH. 94 3839 B, 1222. B 06. (9th of September 1807) 
BOA, HH. 344 19648 A, 1223. Z 13. (30th of January 1809) 
BOA, HH. 95 3842 A, 1227. Z 29. (3th of January 1813) 
74 
 
BOA, HH. 343 19585 B, 1227. Z 29. (3th of January 1813) 
BOA, HH. 343 19599, 1229. Z 29. (3rd of January 1813) 
BOA, HH. 341 19533, 1230. Ş 27. (4th of August 1815) 
BOA, HH. 344 19648, 1230. Z 29. (2nd of December 1815)   
BOA, HH. 345 19690 D, 1231. R 22. (22nd of March 1816) 
BOA, HH. 345 19674, 1232. Ş 03. (18th of June 1817) 
BOA, HH. 344 19650 A, 1233. Za (September/October 1818) 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 
Aksan, Virginia.  The Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged. New York: 
Routledge, 2013. 
Al-Rasheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. 
Al-Rasheed, Madawi. Politics In An Arabian Oasis. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997. 
Algar, Hamid. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. New York: Islamic Publications 
International, 2002. 
Atalar, Münir. Osmanlı Devleti’nde Surre-i Hümâyûn ve Surre Alayları. Ankara: Diyanet 
İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1991. 
Ayaz, Betül. “Hilafet ve Siyaset: Osmanlı Devleti’nin Hac Hizmetleri (1798-1876).” PhD 
diss., Marmara University, 2014. 
Al-Azmeh, Aziz. Islams and Modernities. London: Verso, 1993. 
Beydilli, Kemal. “Küçük Kaynarca Antlaşması.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam 
Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 26. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2002. 
Beydilli, Kemal. “Mahmud II.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 27. 
İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003. 
Beydilli, Kemal. “Selim III.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 36. 
İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009. 
Beydilli, Kemal. “Yaş Antlaşması.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 43. 
İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2013. 
75 
 
Büyükkara, Mehmet Ali. “Vehhabilik.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 
42. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2012. 
Choueiri, Youssef M. Islamic Fundamentalism. London: Pinter, 1997. 
Cleveland, William L. and Bunton, Martin. A History of the Modern Middle East. 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2009. 
Commins, David. The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006. 
Cook, Michael. “Muhammed b. Abdülvehhab.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam 
Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 30. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005. 
Cook, Michael. “On the Origins of Wahhābism.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 
Third Series 2, no.2 (1992): 191-202. 
Dallal, Ahmad. “The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850.” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 113, no. 3 (1993): 341-359. 
Davison, Roderic. “Where is the Middle East?” Foreign Affairs 38 (1960): 665-675.  
DeLong-Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. New 
York: I. B. Tauris, 2007.   
Ecer, Ahmet Vehbi. Tarihte Vehhabi Hareketi ve Etkileri. Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik 
Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001. 
Ende, W. “Wahhabiyya.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. XI. Leiden: Brill, 2002. 
Evered, Emine Ö. “Rereading Ottoman Accounts of Wahhabism as Alternative Narratives: 
Ahmed Cevdet Paşa’s Historical Survey of the Movement.” Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 32, no. 3 (2012): 622-632. 
Findley, Carter Vaughn. “The Political Culture and the Great Households.” In the 
Cambridge History of Turkey, edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi, 3. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
Genç, Mehmet. “Mâlikâne.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 27. 
İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003. 
Görgün, Tahsin. “Tecdid.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 40. İstanbul: 
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2011. 
Güner, Selda. Osmanlı Arabistanı’nda Kıyam ve Tenkil: Vehhâbi-Suûdiler (1744-1819). 
İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2012. 
Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008. 
Hathaway, Jane. The Arab Lands Under the Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800. New York: 
Routledge, 2013. 
76 
 
Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 2002. 
Khalil, Osamah F. “The Crossroads of the World: U.S. and British Foreign Policy 
Doctrines and the Construct of the Middle East, 1902-2007.” Diplomatic History 
38, no. 2 (2014): 299-344.  
Kohlberg, E. “Al-Rafida.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. VIII. Leiden: Brill, 1995. 
Kurşun, Zekeriya. “Hicaz.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 17. İstanbul: 
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998. 
Kurşun, Zekeriya. Necid ve Ahsa’da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud 
Devleti’nin Ortaya Çıkışı. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998.  
Küçükaşcı, Mustafa Sabri. Abbasiler’den Osmanlılar’a Mekke-Medine Tarihi. İstanbul: 
Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007. 
Küçükaşçı, Mustafa Sabri. “Medine.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 
28. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003. 
Laoust, H.” Ibn Abd Al Wahhab.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. III. Leiden: Brill, 
1986. 
Lapidus, Ira M. “Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the 
Paradigms.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 40, no. 4 
(1997): 444-460.  
Lapidus, Ira M. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002. 
Lewicki, T. “Al-Ibadiyya.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. III. Leiden: Brill, 1986. 
Mardin, Şerif. “Adem-i Merkeziyet.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 1. 
İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988. 
Masters, Bruce. The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural 
History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Öz, Mustafa. “Muhammed b. Abdülvehhab.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. 
Vol. 30. İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005. 
Özervarlı, M. Sait. “Selefiyye.” In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi. Vol. 36. 
İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2009. 
Quataert, Donald. The Ottoman Empire: 1700-1922. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
Raymond, André. Osmanlı Döneminde Arap Kentleri. Translated by Ali Berktay. İstanbul: 
Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayını, 1995. 
Robson, J. “Bid’a.” In The Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol. I. Leiden: Brill, 1986.  
77 
 
Somel, Selçuk Akşin. “Osman Nuri Paşa’nın 17 Temmuz 1885 Tarihli Hicaz Raporu.” 
Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi XVIII, no. 29 (1997): 1-22.  
Şeker, Fatih M. Osmanlılar ve Vehhâbilik. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2016. 
Uthaymin, Abd Allah al-Salih. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab: the Man and his Works. 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009. 
Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınları, 2013. 
Voll, John O. “Linking Groups in the Networks of Eighteenth-Century Revivalist Scholars: 
The Mizjaji Family in Yemen.” In Eighteenth Century Renewal and Reform in 
Islam 1987, edited by Nemeiah Levtzion and John O. Voll, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1987.  
Watt, W. Montgomery. Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999. 
Wictorowicz, Quintan. “A Genealogy of Radical Islam.” Studies in Conflict & Terorrism 
28, no. 2 (2006): 75-97.   
Yamani, Mai. Cradle of Islam: The Hijaz and The Quest for an Arab Identity. New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2006. 
Zysow, A. “Zakat,” In The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. XI. Leiden: Brill, 2002 406-422. 
